1Z wrote:
> Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using
AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational
possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you
propose as the relata (i.e. when you've gone 'all the way down')?
> They are very different, and a lot of the work is done
> by the Platonic assumption.
Good, we seem to agree that the conclusions of comp1 and comp2 are
different. And specifically the question of recursive priority - what
emerges from what - is hardly a trivial difference. Bruno has argued,
if I've got it right, that comp supports 1-->3 over 3-->1 (3 = 'the
relata'). Do you have a knock-down argument to the contrary, other than
a philosophical commitment to the priority of what can be 'seen' (as
opposed to, as Colin would no doubt say, *that* it can be seen)?
BTW, I'm not arguing from the perspective of a 'convert' to comp,
merely as an interested seeker. However, like Colin, I don't feel that
physics as normally practised takes seriously enough the *fact* of
there being an observation (as opposed to the *effect* of an
observational process). When considered at all, it's as a putative
'relational side effect' of the physics (e.g. standard
computationalism). So part of my interest in comp is motivated by the
fact that it treats this aspect of 'everything' with maximum
seriousness, explicitly seeking a theory that elucidates the structure
of 'observation' equally with that of the 'observables' thus revealed.
Consequently, it may be of value to put final judgement on what sort of
state-of-affairs could support 'RITSIAR' on hold, pending an
exploration of these very interesting implications of comp.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > > > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
> > > > as to its roots in 'physical causality'.
> > >
> > > No, not entirely opaque.
> >
> > Could you illuminate?
>
> Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
>
> > > Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not
> > > the conclusion.
> >
> > Yes indeed, but the conclusions (e.g. the explanatory direction of
> > 3-person <--> 1-person) are surely somewhat different?
>
> They are very different, and a lot of the work is done
> by the Platonic assumption.
>
> > David
> >
> >
> > > David Nyman wrote:
> > > > 1Z wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
> > > > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
> > > > > and highly significant.
> > > >
> > > > It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have
> > > > remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical.
> > > >
> > > > > A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism
> > > > > is much less so.
> > > >
> > > > Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP?
> > >
> > > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
> > >
> > > > We do need, I
> > > > think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between
> > > >
> > > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > > > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
> > > > as to its roots in 'physical causality'.
> > >
> > > No, not entirely opaque.
> > >
> > > > and
> > > >
> > > > 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure
> > > > on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its
> > > > axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR,
> > > > etc.
> > >
> > > Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not
> > > the conclusion.
> > >
> > > > David
> > > >
> > > > > David Nyman wrote:
> > > > > > Brent Meeker wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way to > judge whether it is a good model to see how it corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real > model - but so might any other model that fits all the data.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in
> > > > > > fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the
> > > > > > data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the
> > > > > > data'.
> > > > >
> > > > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
> > > > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
> > > > > and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism
> > > > > is much less so.
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Received on Sun Oct 22 2006 - 17:35:42 PDT