Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 09-oct.-06, à 21:54, George Levy a écrit :
>
> To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also
> split,
>
>
> ?
This is simple. The time/space/substrate/level of the observer must
match the time/space/substrate/level of what he observes. The Leibniz
analogy is good. In your example if one observes just the recording
without observing the earlier creation of the recording and the later
utilization of the recording, then one may conclude rightfully that the
recording is not conscious.
> in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space,
> substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). In
> your example, for an observer to see consciousness in the machine,
> he must be willing to exist at the earlier interval, skip over the
> time delay carrying the recording and resume his existence at the
> later interval. If he observes only a part of the whole thing, say
> the recording, he may conclude that the machine is not conscious.
>
>
> This is unclear for me. Unless you are just saying like Leibniz that
> you will not "see" consciousness in a brain by examining it under a
> microscope.
>
> Note also that I could attribute consciousness to a recording, but
> this makes sense only if the recording is precise enough so that I
> could add the "Klaras" or anything which would make it possible to
> continue some conversation with the system. And then I do not
> attribute consciousness to the physical appearance of the system, but
> to some people which manifests him/it/herself through it.
Adding Klaras complicate the problem but the result is the same. Klaras
must be programmed. Programming is like recording, a means for inserting
oneself at programming time for later playback at execution time. I have
already shown that Maudlin was cheating by rearranging his tape, in
effect programming the tape. So I agree with you if you agree that
programming the tape sequence is just a means for connecting different
pieces of a conscious processes where each piece operates at different
times.
> In addition, if we are going to split consciousness maximally in
> this fashion, the concept of observer becomes important, something
> you do not include in your example.
>
> Could you elaborate. I don't understand. As a consequence of the
> reasoning the observer (like the knower, the feeler) will all be very
> important (and indeed will correspond to the hypostases (n-person pov)
> in the AUDA). But in the reasoning, well either we are valid going
> from one step to the next or not, and I don't see the relevance of
> your point here. I guess I miss something.
>
I do not understand the connection with the hypostases in the AUDA.
However, it is true that the conscious machine is its own observer, no
matter how split its operation is. (i.e., time sharing, at different
levels... etc). However, the examples will be more striking if a
separate observer is introduced. Of course the separate observer will
have to track the time/space/substrate/level of the machine to observe
the machine to be conscious (possibly with a Turing test). Forgive me
for insisting on a separate observer, but I think that a relativity
approach could bear fruits.
You could even get rid of the recording and replace it with random
inputs (happy rays in your paper).
As you can see with random inputs, the machine is not conscious to an
observer anchored in the physical. The machine just appears to follow a
random series of states.
But if the machine can be observed to be conscious if it is observed
precisely at those times when the random inputs match the counterfactual
recording. So the observer needs to "open his eyes" precisely only at
those times. So the observer needs to be linked in some ways to the
machine being conscious.
If the observer is the (self reflecting) machine itself there is no
problem, the observer will automatically be conscious at those times.
If the observer is not the machine, we need to invoke a mechanism that
will force him to be conscious at those times. It will have to be almost
identical to the machine and will have to accept the same random data So
in a sense the observer will have to be a parallel machine with some
possible variations as long as these variations are not large enough to
make the observer and the machine exist on different
time/space/substrate/level.
Therefore from the point of view of the second machine, the first
machine appears conscious. Note that for the purpose of the argument WE
don't have to assume initially that the second machine IS conscious,
only that it can detect if the first machine is conscious. Now once we
establish that the first machine is conscious we can infer that the
second machine is also conscious simply because it is identical.
The example is of course a representation of our own (many)world.
>
>
> (**) I am open to thoroughly discuss this, for example in november.
> Right now I am a bit over-busy (until the end of october).
>
I'll be traveling to France in early November. We'll leave the detailed
discussion for later in November.
>
> OK. Take your time.
>
>
>
> I will, thanks. In the meanwhile I would appreciate if you could
> elaborate your point.
>
George
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Received on Tue Oct 10 2006 - 23:47:45 PDT