Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2006 12:18:37 +0200

Le 20-sept.-06, à 21:06, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
>>> This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
>>> matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
>>> while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of
>>> comp,
>>> it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.
>> If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if
>> there
>> is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then
>> that
>> piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it
>> would lead to a zombie.
> I don't understand that. Computations are Turing emulable - not
> material objects.

Only if you *assume* primary matter. But the uda shows you can't do
that unless you postulate NOT-COMP.

>> OK then.
>> But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive
>> matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without
>> using
>> actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories.
>> Again, from a strictly logical point of view you are correct, but then
>> we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something
>> describable by physics,
> I don't see that point either. Perhaps you only mean that the
> mathematical
> descriptions used by physics would not *completely* constitute matter?

No. I am just asking to Peter what is primary matter.

>> and it is above anything imaginable to link
>> that stuff to consciousness.
>> Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am
>> afraid
>> we will not make progress.
> That seems backwards. Physics works with matter which is defined
> ostensively and by
> operational definitions.

About matter yes, but you can't define primary matter in any ostensive
or operational definition.
Aristotelian reification of primary matter has led to some
"methodological materialism" which has eased the mind for physicists
for some time, but which does no more work for the quantum, and is
epistemologically contradictory with comp.

> To insist on an axiomatization seems to me to beg the
> question of whether reality is a purely mathematical object.

I ask for this to Peter because I try to understand what he means by
his notion of primary matter. That's all.

Now with comp, reality cannot be defined by a mathematical object.
More: it cannot be defined by any "object". This has been understood by
Plato, Plotinus, and all the neoplatonist. It is the root of my (old)
critics of Tegmark: if I am mathematical (which is the case with comp
and I = the 3 person I) then the 1-person I and the whole relaity are
not mathematical. I am just taking into account the moadl nuancce
introduced by the incompleteness phenomenon.

> It is only descriptions
> that can be axiomatized.


BTW, I know you know a bit of logic. Have you understand the nuance
between Bp and Bp & p ? (where B is the godel provability predicate,
and p is any arithmetical sentence)?

It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine,
then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why
the 1-person is solipsist, although the 1-person does not need to be
doctrinaire about that (fortunately enough).


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Received on Fri Sep 22 2006 - 06:20:12 PDT

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