marc.geddes.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> I don't totally agree. I think qualia have a dual-aspect: they are
> *both* Ontological (the fabric of reality itself) *and* Epistemological
> (the means through which reality is experienced).
But I think we *do* agree - I would put it precisely as you have above.
> I wouldn't read much into the fact that humans can't communicate qualia
> directly.
I think we are experiencing terminological difficulties. In fact we
don't communicate *anything* 'directly' (i.e. without mediation) - this
is simply not what we mean by 'communication' (i.e. the mediated
distribution of information). Information is distributed on the basis
of which we construct analogs of a source experience - i.e. we
instantiate them: equivalently we experience them. The ontic/ epistemic
distinction is simply the 'role' (medium/ content) being played in a
given narrative by different aspects of a 'fabric' (which in your
analysis is a mathematical metaphysics) at a given level. And in the
case of qualia, the role is to mediate the communication, but by that
same token not to be part of the *information* thus communicated. So in
'experiencing' qualia, we gain access to information *mediated by
qualia*; or equivalently: we *instantiate* such information and thus
represent it 'to ourselves directly' (i.e. without further mediation).
> I maintain that a mind which *could* directly represent
> mathematical concepts in its consciousness would no longer be confused
> about Qualia in the slightest.
But I'm saying precisely that qualia *are* the direct (i.e. immediate)
representation of such concepts, if those concepts are indeed
ontological categories as you suggest. And to follow your 'blindsight'
analogy, if instead of this we had the machinery to 'see' the
underlying structure of our present qualia in some more directly
accessible way, this would be *qualitatively different*, not 'lacking
qualities'. To 'have qualities' = to experience immediately = to
instantiate.
So I agree that were we able to be 'conscious' at another level about
'qualia' we would be unconfused about their structure - but this new
consciousness would itself take place in terms of a novel level of
'qualia' to whose internal structure we would be equally blind. This is
entailed by the necessity for any 'fabric of reality' to differentiate
situationally into perceiver-roles and percept-roles. This generates
both the many povs, their perceptual capabilities and contents, and by
the same differentiation, their ineliminable 'blindspots'.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > marc.geddes.domain.name.hidden wrote:
> >
> > > Whoa dude. That is some heavy-duty 'reality theory' speak ;)
> >
> > Yes indeedy. But my point is that qualia are an ontological category,
> > not an epistemological one. This is crucial, because it entails that we
> > can't *know* qualia, we can only instantiate them - *be* them. What we
> > know - epistemology - is possible only in terms of the ontological
> > categories that instantiate information, and qualia are examples of
> > these categories that we personally instantiate, and in terms of which
> > we 'know' seeing, tasting, touching, and all the rest. Consequently we
> > cannot communicate such categories directly, but we can invite others
> > to instantiate them - by communicating the necessary information - and
> > consequently achieve commensurable dialogue by indicating the relevant
> > parts of our personal instantiations.
>
>
> I don't totally agree. I think qualia have a dual-aspect: they are
> *both* Ontological (the fabric of reality itself) *and* Epistemological
> (the means through which reality is experienced). See what I said in
> the other thread: for the ontological categories which are universal in
> scope (i.e the objectively real math concepts) I think there is *no*
> difference between Cognitive categories and Metaphysical ones. Math is
> both the fabric of reality (metaphysics) *and* the means through which
> reality is experienced and categorized (epistemology).
>
> I wouldn't read much into the fact that humans can't communicate qualia
> directly. I see this as a limitation of the human mind rather than a
> fundamental limitation. The reason we're so horribly confused about
> Qualia is that the human brain is not capable of consciously
> representing mathematical concepts. As regards mathematics we humans
> are like someone suffering from 'blind-sight' : we can reason about
> math indirectly in an abstract, intellectual sense (we can have
> abstract mathematical knowledge), but we humans have no direct
> *conscious* representations of mathematical concepts.
>
> This is why I keep pointing out my theory that phenomal properties are
> identical to mathematical properties. The fact that the human mind
> cannot consiously represent mathematical concepts is the source of all
> our confusion. I maintain that a mind which *could* directly represent
> mathematical concepts in its consciousness would no longer be confused
> about Qualia in the slightest.
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Received on Fri Sep 22 2006 - 05:05:24 PDT