Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
>>This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
>>matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
>>while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
>>it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.
>
>
> If matter exists, and if consciousness is dependent on it, and if there
> is no actual infinities on which my consciousness can depend, then that
> piece of matter is turing emulable, and so by turing-emulating it, it
> would lead to a zombie.
I don't understand that. Computations are Turing emulable - not material objects.
> OK then.
> But now I have still less understanding of your notion of primitive
> matter. You could define it by anything making comp false without using
> actual infinities, and this would lead to ad hoc theories.
> Again, from a strictly logical point of view you are correct, but then
> we have to ask you what you mean by matter. It is no more something
> describable by physics,
I don't see that point either. Perhaps you only mean that the mathematical
descriptions used by physics would not *completely* constitute matter?
>and it is above anything imaginable to link
> that stuff to consciousness.
> Unless you present some axiomatic of your notion of matter, I am afraid
> we will not make progress.
That seems backwards. Physics works with matter which is defined ostensively and by
operational definitions. To insist on an axiomatization seems to me to beg the
question of whether reality is a purely mathematical object. It is only descriptions
that can be axiomatized.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Wed Sep 20 2006 - 15:08:31 PDT