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From: Christopher Maloney <dude.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1999 22:50:32 -0400

Russell Standish wrote:

*>
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*> >
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*> > 4. Subjective probabilities can be computed on the basis of the
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*> > Strong SSA, and we get
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*> > P(H, t1) = 1/2
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*> > P(H, t2) = P(H, t3) = 2/3
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*> > If this is the case, then I think we have to throw Tegmark's
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*> > scheme using Bayesian statistics out the window. This option
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*> > has severe metaphysical problems, though, in my opinion. I
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*> > think Hal was saying, in his post, either this option, or
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*> > option 1 above, but I'm not sure.
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*> >
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*> > 5. Subjective probabilities can be computed, and we should expect
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*> > the common-sense results
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*> > P(H, t1) = 1/2
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*> > P(H, t2) = P(H, t3) = 1/2
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*> >
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*> > It's a fair coin, after all, right?
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*> > I think this gets Gilles' and Bruno's vote (and Russell's?)
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*> >
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*> > 6. Subjective probabilities can be computed, and we should expect
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*> > the nonsensical results
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*> > P(H, t1) = 2/3
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*> > P(H, t2) = P(H, t3) = 2/3
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*> >
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*>
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*> If the probabilities can be computed, then compute them. I have
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*> computed the probabilities as being 1/2,1/2. If you compute them as
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*> 1/3,2/3, then you need to advance a similar computation, and then for
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*> good measure, show me where I erred. Probability calculations are
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*> notorious for their subtleties, so I won't take offence at being shown
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*> wrong. At present, the only argument I can see that gives the
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*> probabilities as 1/3,2/3 is the one based on the strong SSA - (your
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*> point 4) - an assumption that I reject.
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Clearly there is not enough information to simply "compute" the

probabilities from Jane's subjective perspective, without making

some additional assumptions. In your computation, you assume that

the measure of each branch is unaffected by its future evolution.

*> A reverse causality type of argument would assume that you would never
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*> enter branches that have no escape routes. I have toyed with this
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*> idea, but reject it - principally because I have yet to see an example
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*> of a branch with no escape route, so in essence it becomes
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*> meaningless
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This makes no sense to me. Let's rewind it -- You have yet to see a

branch with no escape route. Fine, I haven't either. Let's assume there

are none. The reverse causality argument would assume that you never

enter branches that have no escape routes. Fine, we've just assumed that

there are none. So what's the problem?

*>, but if there were such brances - my belief in foward
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*> causality is so strong, I would prefer to question quantum
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*> immortality, than to invoke reverse causality as a way of salvaging
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*> QI.
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Yes, I guess I've been trying to make the point that QTI implies reverse

causality. I think it does.

Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1999 22:50:32 -0400

Russell Standish wrote:

Clearly there is not enough information to simply "compute" the

probabilities from Jane's subjective perspective, without making

some additional assumptions. In your computation, you assume that

the measure of each branch is unaffected by its future evolution.

This makes no sense to me. Let's rewind it -- You have yet to see a

branch with no escape route. Fine, I haven't either. Let's assume there

are none. The reverse causality argument would assume that you never

enter branches that have no escape routes. Fine, we've just assumed that

there are none. So what's the problem?

Yes, I guess I've been trying to make the point that QTI implies reverse

causality. I think it does.

-- Chris Maloney http://www.chrismaloney.com "Donuts are so sweet and tasty." -- Homer SimpsonReceived on Wed Aug 18 1999 - 19:57:56 PDT

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