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From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Mon, 16 Aug 1999 13:14:15 +1000 (EST)

*>
*

*> 4. Subjective probabilities can be computed on the basis of the
*

*> Strong SSA, and we get
*

*> P(H, t1) = 1/2
*

*> P(H, t2) = P(H, t3) = 2/3
*

*> If this is the case, then I think we have to throw Tegmark's
*

*> scheme using Bayesian statistics out the window. This option
*

*> has severe metaphysical problems, though, in my opinion. I
*

*> think Hal was saying, in his post, either this option, or
*

*> option 1 above, but I'm not sure.
*

*>
*

*> 5. Subjective probabilities can be computed, and we should expect
*

*> the common-sense results
*

*> P(H, t1) = 1/2
*

*> P(H, t2) = P(H, t3) = 1/2
*

*>
*

*> It's a fair coin, after all, right?
*

*> I think this gets Gilles' and Bruno's vote (and Russell's?)
*

*>
*

*> 6. Subjective probabilities can be computed, and we should expect
*

*> the nonsensical results
*

*> P(H, t1) = 2/3
*

*> P(H, t2) = P(H, t3) = 2/3
*

*>
*

If the probabilities can be computed, then compute them. I have

computed the probabilities as being 1/2,1/2. If you compute them as

1/3,2/3, then you need to advance a similar computation, and then for

good measure, show me where I erred. Probability calculations are

notorious for their subtleties, so I won't take offence at being shown

wrong. At present, the only argument I can see that gives the

probabilities as 1/3,2/3 is the one based on the strong SSA - (your

point 4) - an assumption that I reject.

A reverse causality type of argument would assume that you would never

enter branches that have no escape routes. I have toyed with this

idea, but reject it - principally because I have yet to see an example

of a branch with no escape route, so in essence it becomes

meaningless, but if there were such brances - my belief in foward

causality is so strong, I would prefer to question quantum

immortality, than to invoke reverse causality as a way of salvaging

QI.

*> This is what I believe is probably true. I think that there
*

*> must be a sort of "reverse causality" at work, which would
*

*> increase the measure of the right branch of Jane at time t1
*

*> (the branch that sees heads, but before the copy is made).
*

*>
*

*> This still has Jacques' problem of allowing pseudo-zombies.
*

*> If we switch to Jacques' example and assume two copying events,
*

*> then the Jane on the left branch, at time t1, would have less
*

*> measure than the Jane on the right (note the contrast between
*

*> this result and the previous, where the Janes that were the
*

*> product of the second copying operation were accorded less
*

*> measure).
*

*>
*

*> But I don't see this as a problem. What I'm suggesting is that
*

*> each human alive today has a varying amount of "measure". It's
*

*> incorrect to assume that each person, when they are born, is
*

*> given a single "measure unit". By my scheme, a person with a
*

*> terminal illness with only a few days to live would have a
*

*> very small measure of existence, relative to others.
*

*>
*

*> I can't help wondering, often, why I find myself to be the
*

*> particular human I am. Do you others wonder this? One thought
*

*> I've had (please don't laugh at me too badly) is that the fact
*

*> that I have a pretty poor memory might be significant. If I
*

*> had a better memory, then my measure would be less, because
*

*> fewer universes could have given rise to me. Of course, this
*

*> reasoning probably won't work for you, but that doesn't make it
*

*> any less valid from my perspective, which is the only one I
*

*> have.
*

*>
*

*> I came to believe in this "reverse causality" while pondering
*

*> the QS project I wrote about before. I started to expect that
*

*> things would crop up in my way to prevent my being able to
*

*> complete the project, before it came to fruition. It didn't
*

*> (and it still doesn't) make sense to me that the measure of all
*

*> my branches should be unaffected until the very instant that I
*

*> carry out the experiment. Because if the assumption that I'll
*

*> be alive after the experiment date is correct, then I can expect
*

*> to have memories at that time of somehow having escaped. And
*

*> I should, in general, expect to have a memory of "the most
*

*> likely" escape route, or of one of the most likely ones, if there
*

*> are several that are near-equally likely.
*

*>
*

*> But how can one reconcile that with the concept of continuity of
*

*> consciousness from moment to moment? Only if there is a reverse
*

*> causality at work.
*

*>
*

*> This theory has significant and testable implications. Viz: we
*

*> should expect to find ourselves in a universe that will allow us
*

*> to live forever. I.e. this leads directly to the requirement
*

*> that the FAP is true. Just consider if time t1 and t2 are
*

*> separated by a larger and larger time span. Consider also that
*

*> those branches in which we cease to exist also tend to decrease
*

*> the measure of all the observer-moments in previous subjective
*

*> time.
*

*>
*

True, although it is a very weak requirement. It certainly does not

imply the existence of an Omega point. That it doesn't contradict the

existence of such a point is also illustrated by the Tiplerian type

argument.

*> Basically, the measure of our observer-moments at the next
*

*> instant in subjective time are weighted as the number of continous
*

*> paths from that observer-moment to the "Omega-point". This is
*

*> my crackpot theory. Though it's certainly hard to justify on the
*

*> basis of the SSA on a moment-by-moment basis (the Strong SSA), I
*

*> haven't yet found anything that contradicts it. I know that's
*

*> not good enough, but anyway I find it the most satisfying
*

*> result of the above thought experiment. All the other possibilities
*

*> are problematic.
*

*>
*

*>
*

*>
*

*>
*

*> --
*

*> Chris Maloney
*

*> http://www.chrismaloney.com
*

*>
*

*> "Donuts are so sweet and tasty."
*

*> -- Homer Simpson
*

*>
*

*>
*

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Russell Standish Director

High Performance Computing Support Unit,

University of NSW Phone 9385 6967

Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965

Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden

Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received on Sun Aug 15 1999 - 20:14:48 PDT

Date: Mon, 16 Aug 1999 13:14:15 +1000 (EST)

If the probabilities can be computed, then compute them. I have

computed the probabilities as being 1/2,1/2. If you compute them as

1/3,2/3, then you need to advance a similar computation, and then for

good measure, show me where I erred. Probability calculations are

notorious for their subtleties, so I won't take offence at being shown

wrong. At present, the only argument I can see that gives the

probabilities as 1/3,2/3 is the one based on the strong SSA - (your

point 4) - an assumption that I reject.

A reverse causality type of argument would assume that you would never

enter branches that have no escape routes. I have toyed with this

idea, but reject it - principally because I have yet to see an example

of a branch with no escape route, so in essence it becomes

meaningless, but if there were such brances - my belief in foward

causality is so strong, I would prefer to question quantum

immortality, than to invoke reverse causality as a way of salvaging

QI.

True, although it is a very weak requirement. It certainly does not

imply the existence of an Omega point. That it doesn't contradict the

existence of such a point is also illustrated by the Tiplerian type

argument.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Russell Standish Director

High Performance Computing Support Unit,

University of NSW Phone 9385 6967

Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965

Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden

Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received on Sun Aug 15 1999 - 20:14:48 PDT

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