# Re: zombie wives

From: Jacques M. Mallah <jqm1584.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1999 15:34:00 -0400 (EDT)

On 18 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> Jacques M. Mallah wrote:
> >> Russell Standish wrote:
> >> I still don't see what measure has to do with conciousness!
> > That is the problem.
> I don't see that either.
> The measure is defined on the set of computations and gives the
> relative probability of living such and such experiences.
> It has nothing to do with the intensity of each experience.

No one ever suggested it might, so I don't know what you're
talking about. Measure is the amount of consciousness, and effective
probability is proportional to measure.
There is no reason to be confused about amount vs. intensity. If
you want an analogy you can think of paint. Intensity, quality, or
whatever you want to call it describes the *color* of the paint, but the
*amount* of paint is another issue. If you have two colors, red and blue,
the "effective probability" of red is analagous to the amount of red
paint divided by the total amount of paint.

> It is the same with your physical computationalism, because if
> a computation is well-implemented (in your "physical" sense), then
> the duplication will be well-implemented too.
> Needless to say your zombie argument doesn't work with COMP (Pure COMP),
> but I don't see how it works with your
> own (hybrid) PHYSical COMPutationalism.

I repeat: the zombies are an artefact of the approach that is used
to justify QS. I do NOT think there would be zombies. It's an attempt to
expose the absurdity of QS.

> Nor does it work with Everett MWI. Your argument looks a little
> like the argument against MWI from which it follows that Energy is
> not conserved in the 'multiplication of worlds'.

Not at all. Obviously if there is no copying or killing (or
birthing), we all agree that the measure of observers stays the same in
the MWI (at least to a good approximation).

- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)