Jacques M. Mallah wrote:
>> Russell Standish wrote:
>> I still don't see what measure has to do with conciousness!
>
> That is the problem.
I don't see that either.
The measure is defined on the set of computations and gives the
relative probability of living such and such experiences.
It has nothing to do with the intensity of each experience.
It is the same with your physical computationalism, because if
a computation is well-implemented (in your "physical" sense), then
the duplication will be well-implemented too.
Needless to say your zombie argument doesn't work with COMP (Pure COMP),
but I don't see how it works with your
own (hybrid) PHYSical COMPutationalism.
Nor does it work with Everett MWI. Your argument looks a little
like the argument against MWI from which it follows that Energy is
not conserved in the 'multiplication of worlds'.
Bruno.
Received on Wed Aug 18 1999 - 10:11:30 PDT
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