Re: zombie wives

From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 1999 12:59:29 +1000 (EST)

> >
> > Somewhere along the way, you have made a questionable assumption. It
> > sounds like the measure that you're describing has some kind of
> > conservation law (which I would question). That conservation law (if
> > it is what you're assuming) would deny the existence of such copying
> > machines.
>
> What I am trying to do is to look at the consequences of the
> claims made by the quantum suicide camp. The claim is that consciousness
> 'flows into' possible continuations of oneself and is, in effect,
> conserved as long as such continuations exist. I by no means accept this
> claim. However I see no reason why you say it would deny the existence of
> copying machines.

Because copying machines increase one's measure, but not effective
probability, which remains normalised.

In this copying machine incident, we assume that a person experiencing
the event has a 50% chance of experiencing being either copy. However,
each Jane will be fully concsious - there is no diluting of that
conciousness. An outside observer will be unable to distinguish who
was the "real Jane".

>
> > The truth is, you lost me a long time ago, as this email is almost
> > completely impenetrable.
>

The trouble starts when you start talking about a reduction in
concsiousness, so that we end up with a million zombies. The above
definition of the copying machine clearly contradicts this
statement. Therefore, you must have a different idea of what the
copying machine is. However, in that case, I can't see what relevance
this argument has to QS.

> If it's still not clear, please ask a specific question.
> If the problem is that QSers may deny that measure is conserved,
> that problem is not my fault. By their other words it is clear that they
> believe it is. (You may be included in the group I mean by 'them'.) I am
> the one using the term correctly.
>
> > > Another example is that when a person comes into being, he
> > > supposedly has a standard allotment of measure (1 unit). But suppose that
> > > there already exists a being with very small measure such that the 'new'
> > > person is a 'computational continuation' of the old being. (e.g.
> > > one of the above women with particular life experiences.) Suddenly the
> > > new person (supposedly) has very small measure! But if a parameter in a
> > > model is adjusted until the old being (in this model) vanishes completely,
> > > suddenly the measure of this new person (supposedly) springs back up to 1.
> > > I don't think a QSer could get away with denying the reverse
> > > process. There could be a cyclical process in which the number of copies
> > > is varied periodically with time (with instant copying and killing
> > > machines).

True - however copying is different to inhabiting (or not inhabiting)
different branches of the multiverse. You don't get an identity crisis
in the MW case. In your cyclical process, in killing the Jane copies,
what you will always experience is "the other Jane" being killed
(assuming they are killed by some random process, and it's gard to see
how it could be otherwise, since the two Janes are indestinguishable),
as that will the branch in which your conciousness survives.

I still don't see what measure has to do with conciousness!


> > >
> > > - - - - - - -
> > > Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> > > Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> > > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> > > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Dr. Russell Standish Director
> > High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> > University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> > Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
> > Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> > Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
>
>



----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Received on Sun Aug 15 1999 - 20:01:49 PDT

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