1Z wrote:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>>Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it is the case if
>>computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the self-evident
>>absurdity of the idea as an argument demonstrating that computationalism is false -
>>that there is something non-computational about brains and consciousness. I have not
>>yet heard an argument that rejects this idea and saves computationalism.
>
>
> [ rolls up sleaves ]
>
> The idea is easilly refuted if it can be shown that computation doesn't
> require
> interpretation at all. It can also be refuted more circuitously by
> showing that
> computation is not entirely a matter of intepretation. In everythingism
> , eveything
> is equal. If some computations (the ones that don't depend on
> interpretation) are
> "more equal than others", the way is still open for the Somethinginst
> to object
> that interpretation-independent computations are really real, and the
> others are
> mere possibilities.
>
> The claim has been made that computation is "not much use" without an
> interpretation.
> Well, if you define a computer as somethin that is used by a human,
> that is true.
> It is also very problematic to the computationalist claim that the
> human mind is a computer.
> Is the human mind of use to a human ? Well, yes, it helps us stay alive
> in various ways.
> But that is more to do with reacting to a real-time environment, than
> performing abstract symbolic manipulations or elaborate
> re-interpretations. (Computationalists need to be careful about how
> they define "computer". Under
> some perfectly reasonable definitions -- for instance, defining a
> computer as
> a human invention -- computationalism is trivially false).
>
>
> It is of course true that the output of a programme intended to do one
> thing
> ("system S", say) could be re-interpeted as something else. But what
> does it *mean* ?
> If computationalism is true whoever or whatever is doing the
> interpreting is another
> computational process.
That seems to be the contentious point. If your brain is conscious by implementing
some computational process, then it seems it must be self-interpreting; or put
another way, there is no "interpreting", it is a construct to conform to the
subject/object grammar of our thought.
>SO the ultimate result is formed by system S in
> connjunction
> with another systen. System S is merely acting as a subroutine. The
> Everythingist's
> intended conclusion is that every physical system implements every
> computation.
> But the evidence -- the re-interpretation scenario -- only supports the
> idea
> that any computational system could become part of a larger system that
> is
> doing something else.
I think that comports with my idea that the environment within which a computation
takes place is necessary for its interpretation. But as Stathis points out it
clashes with our experience that we seem to be able to have thoughts independent of
any proximate interaction outside of ourselves. The environment isn't proximaly
involved.
>System S cannot be said to be simultaneously
> perforiming
> every possible computation *itself*. The multiple-computaton -- i.e
> multiple-interpretation
> -- scenario is dependent on a n intepreter. Having made computation
> dependent
> on interpretation, we cannot the regard the interpreter as redundant,
> so that it
> is all being done by the system itself. (Of course to fulfil the
> "every" in
> "every possible interpretation" you need not just interpreters but
> every possible intepreter, but that is another problem for another
> day..)
I think we need to say what it means for a computation to be self-interpreting. Many
control programs are written with self-monitoring functions and logging functions.
Why would we not attribute consciousness to them?
Brent Meeker
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Received on Sat Sep 09 2006 - 17:43:26 PDT