Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it is the case if
> computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the self-evident
> absurdity of the idea as an argument demonstrating that computationalism is false -
> that there is something non-computational about brains and consciousness. I have not
> yet heard an argument that rejects this idea and saves computationalism.
[ rolls up sleaves ]
The idea is easilly refuted if it can be shown that computation doesn't
require
interpretation at all. It can also be refuted more circuitously by
showing that
computation is not entirely a matter of intepretation. In everythingism
, eveything
is equal. If some computations (the ones that don't depend on
interpretation) are
"more equal than others", the way is still open for the Somethinginst
to object
that interpretation-independent computations are really real, and the
others are
mere possibilities.
The claim has been made that computation is "not much use" without an
interpretation.
Well, if you define a computer as somethin that is used by a human,
that is true.
It is also very problematic to the computationalist claim that the
human mind is a computer.
Is the human mind of use to a human ? Well, yes, it helps us stay alive
in various ways.
But that is more to do with reacting to a real-time environment, than
performing abstract symbolic manipulations or elaborate
re-interpretations. (Computationalists need to be careful about how
they define "computer". Under
some perfectly reasonable definitions -- for instance, defining a
computer as
a human invention -- computationalism is trivially false).
It is of course true that the output of a programme intended to do one
thing
("system S", say) could be re-interpeted as something else. But what
does it *mean* ?
If computationalism is true whoever or whatever is doing the
interpreting is another
computational process. SO the ultimate result is formed by system S in
connjunction
with another systen. System S is merely acting as a subroutine. The
Everythingist's
intended conclusion is that every physical system implements every
computation.
But the evidence -- the re-interpretation scenario -- only supports the
idea
that any computational system could become part of a larger system that
is
doing something else. System S cannot be said to be simultaneously
perforiming
every possible computation *itself*. The multiple-computaton -- i.e
multiple-interpretation
-- scenario is dependent on a n intepreter. Having made computation
dependent
on interpretation, we cannot the regard the interpreter as redundant,
so that it
is all being done by the system itself. (Of course to fulfil the
"every" in
"every possible interpretation" you need not just interpreters but
every possible intepreter, but that is another problem for another
day..)
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sat Sep 09 2006 - 15:13:53 PDT