Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 15:17:43 +0200

Le 07-sept.-06, à 16:42, 1Z a écrit :

> Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they
> still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl*
> mathemematical
> (or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do.
> (Platonia
> is broad but flat). Since no-one can explain why matter is impossible
> (as opposed to merely unnecesary) the non-existence of matter is
> a contingent fact.


I guess here you mean "primary matter" for "matter".

Would you say that a thermodynamician has to appeal to the "contingent
brute fact" that car are not pulled by invisible horses?

Does molecular biologist have to appeal to the "contingent brute fact"
that the vital principle is a crackpot principle?

Should all scientist appeal to the "contingent brute fact" that God is
most probably neither white, nor black, nor male, nor female, nor
sitting on a cloud, nor sitting near a cloud ...

Let me be clear on this: comp reduce matter to number relation, it does
not make matter impossible, it explain it from something else, like
physics explain temperature from molecules cinetical energy.
And then you come and talk like if physicists would have shown
temperature impossible?

Do I miss something?

Comp makes primary matter dispensable only like thermodynamics makes
phlogiston dispensable.
And I think that's good given that nobody ever succeed in making those
notion clear.
I still don't know what do you mean by "primary matter".

Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Fri Sep 08 2006 - 09:20:39 PDT

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