Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>A non-conscious computation cannot be *useful* without the manual/interpretation,
>>>and in this sense could be called just a potential computation, but a conscious
>>>computation is still *conscious* even if no-one else is able to figure this out or
>>>interact with it. If a working brain in a vat were sealed in a box and sent into
>>>space, it could still be dreaming away even after the whole human race and all
>>>their information on brain function are destroyed in a supernova explosion. As far
>>>as any alien is concerned who comes across it, the brain might be completely
>>>inscrutable, but that would not make the slightest difference to its conscious
>>>experience.
>>
>>Suppose the aliens re-implanted the brain in a human body so they could interact with
>>it. They ask it what is was "dreaming" all those years? I think the answer might
>>be, "Years? What years? It was just a few seconds ago I was in the hospital for an
>>appendectomy. What happened? And who are you guys?"
>
>
> Maybe so; even more likely, the brain would just die. But these are contingent facts about
> human brains, while thought experiments rely on theoretical possibility.
That's generally useful; but when we understand little about something, such as
consciousness, we should be careful about assuming what's "theoretically possible";
particularly when it seems to lead to absurdities. How do we know it's a contingent,
and not essential, fact about brains...and conscious thought?
>
>
>>>>>>>then it can be seen as implementing more than one computation
>>>>>>>simultaneously during the given interval.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>AFAICS that is only true in terms of dictionaries.
>>>>>
>>>>>Right: without the dictionary, it's not very interesting or relevant to *us*.
>>>>>If we were to actually map a random physical process onto an arbitrary
>>>>>computation of interest, that would be at least as much work as building and
>>>>>programming a conventional computer to carry out the computation. However,
>>>>>doing the mapping does not make a difference to the *system* (assuming we
>>>>>aren't going to use it to interact with it). If we say that under a certain
>>>>>interpretation - here it is, printed out on paper - the system is implementing
>>>>>a conscious computation, it would still be implementing that computation if we
>>>>>had never determined and printed out the interpretation.
>>
>>And if you added the random values of the physical process as an appendix in the
>>manual, would the manual itself then be a computation (the record problem)? If so
>>how would you tell if it were a conscious computation?
>
>
> The actual physical process becomes almost irrelevant. In the limiting case, all of the
> computation is contained in the manual, the physical existence of which makes no
> difference to whether or not the computation is implemented, since it makes no difference
> to the actual physical activity of the system and the theory under consideration is that
> consciousness supervenes on this physical activity. If we get rid of the qualifier "almost"
> the result is close to Bruno's theory, according to which the physical activity is irrelevant
> and the computation is "run" by virtue of its status as a Platonic object. As I understand
> it, Bruno arrives at this idea because it seems less absurd than the idea that consciousness
> supervenes on any and every physical process, while Maudlin finds both ideas absurd and
> thinks there is something wrong with computationalism.
As I understand your argument, the manual doesn't have to be a one-to-one translator
of states, and so it can "translate" from the null event to any string whatsoever.
So the physical event is irrelevant.
Brent Meeker
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Fri Sep 08 2006 - 13:02:18 PDT