Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > [Stathis Papaioannou]
> > > > > > If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent to the situation where every
> > > > > > computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists implemented on some computer or
> > > > > > brain in a material multiverse. This gives rise to the issues of quantum immortality and the white rabbit
> > > > > > problem, as discussed at great length in the past on this list.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > One way to discredit all this foolishness is to abandon computationalism...
> > >
> > > [Brent Meeker]
> > > > > I don't see how assuming consciousness is non-computational solves any of these
> > > > > conundrums about every object implementing every possible computation.
> > >
> > > > It would mean that every object implementing every possible computation
> > > > doesn't
> > > > imply that every object is conscious. Of course, one can also deny
> > > > that conclusion be regading computation as structural rather than
> > > > semantic.
> > >
> > > You don't have to go as far as saying that *computation* is structural rather than semantic. You only need to say
> > > that *consciousness* is structural, and hence non-computational. That's what some cognitive scientists have done,
> > > eg. Penrose, Searle, Maudlin. Personally, I don't see why there is such a disdain for the idea that every computation
> > > is implemented, including every conscious computation. The idea is still consistent with all the empirical facts, since
> > > we can only interact with a special subset of computations, implemented on conventional computers and brains.
> >
> >
> > Occam's razor, It is an unncessary complication.
>
> No, it's simpler. You would otherwise have to come up with an explanation as to why only particular conscious computations are implemented, and it is that which would make the theory more complicated than it needs to be.
That just goes back to the basic contingency of the universe. "Only
some conputations are implemented" is a special case of "only some
things exist".
Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they
still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl*
mathemematical
(or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do.
(Platonia
is broad but flat). Since no-one can explain why matter is impossible
(as opposed to merely unnecesary) the non-existence of matter is
a contingent fact.
Well, perhaps there is a version of Everyhtingism that deals with
All Kinds of Everything, but it is hard to even put a meaning on
that...
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Thu Sep 07 2006 - 10:44:23 PDT