Re: computationalism and supervenience

From: Quentin Anciaux <>
Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2006 16:58:09 +0200

Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 16:46, 1Z a écrit :
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
> > implemented by every physical system, just (at least) the subset of
> > finite computations implemented by a physical computer or brain. I think
> > this is another way of saying that a recording, or a single trace of a
> > computation branching in the multiverse, can be conscious. To prevent a
> > recording being consious yoiu can insist on counterfactual behaviour, but
> > that seems an ad hoc requirement introduced simply to prevent the
> > "trivial" case of a recording or any physical system implementing a
> > computation.
> The requirement that computations require counterfactuals isn't
> ad hoc, it comes from the observation that computer programmes
> include if-then statements.

Would you say that a conscious program (if it is possible of course, imagine
for the argument) that contains a lot of dead code (code that is not executed
whatever input) should be more "conscious" than the same program without the
dead part ?

If a conscious program exists, and we record all input that this program as
received and like Stathis propose we restart it and feed it with the same
exact input will it still be conscious ?

If your answer to this is is a conscious program exists, it should be non
deterministic... Then that would only mean we cannot record exactly the
input... because a program which use a true random generator is not
deterministic not because of the program which is always deterministic, but
from the inability to predict/record the input exactly. And so my question
would be, is the consciousness located in the random generator instead of the
program ? why bother with the program then ?


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Received on Tue Aug 29 2006 - 11:01:26 PDT

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