Jesse Mazer writes:
> Anyway, without tying my argument to closely to Chalmers' beliefs, what I > meant when I talked about "psychophysical laws" was just a rule for deciding > when a copy of a particular computation has been instantiated physically, > with each instantiation contributing to the total measure of that > computation. You don't even have to postulate a special "physical universe", > you could just ask how frequently copies of a smaller computation are being > instantiated in a larger computation (like a computation representing the > evolution of the universal wavefunction, or a computation representing the > universal uovetailer). For example, let's say I identify a given > observer-moment with a particular computation O which represents all the > computations going on in the observer's brain during that moment (with a > 'moment' of subjective experience presumably corresponding to computations > spread out over tens or hundreds of milliseconds in the physical brain) > which are relevant to what the observer subjectively experiences in that > moment (and there might be plenty of things going on in the physical brain > that *aren't* relevant, like random thermal vibrations of atoms in neurons). > Suppose I also have a larger computation E which is a detailed simulation of > a physical environment that happens to include a brain that seems to be > doing what appears to be a similar set of computations; in this case the > "psychophysical laws" would be some rules that would tell us whether the > larger computation E does in fact contain an "instantiation" of O within it. > And if we postulate some ultimate base-level computation representing > "objective physical reality", like the simulation of the universal > wavefunction or the universal dovetailer, this might contain instantiations > of every possible program, but it might instantiate some more frequently > than others, thus giving some observer-moments higher measure than others. > Finally, even if we reject the idea of a single base-level computation, the > idea of larger computations containing instantiations of smaller ones within > them might still be relevant, since if you identify observer-moments with > particular computations, some observer-moments might contain copies of > smaller ones within them, and this would have to be taken into account in > the sort of "measure battle" that you talk about in other posts.> > So, do you think that the idea of "psychophysical laws" whose sole purpose > is to decide if larger computations contain instantiations of smaller ones, > and therefore contribute to their overall measure, violates > "computationalism" as you understand it? If so, why?
What you seem to be suggesting is that not all computations are equivalent: some give rise to mind, while others, apparently similar, do not. Isn't this similar to the reasoning of people who say that a computer could never be conscious because even if it exactly emulated a human brain, it is a law of nature that only brains can be conscious?
Stathis Papaiaonnou
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Received on Fri Jul 21 2006 - 09:31:50 PDT