Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>
>>> The cited article a rather emotional criticism of Chalmer's ideas.> > > Ah? OK, surely you
>>> know a better resume?
>
>
> Perhaps this one: http://www.thymos.com/mind/chalmers.html
>
> Quoting:
>
>>>> Then Chalmers proceeds to present his own theory of consciousness, that he calls
>>>> "naturalistic dualism" (but might as well have called "naturalistic monism"). It is a
>>>> variant of what is known as "property dualism": there are no two substances (mental and
>>>> physical), there is only one substance, but that substance has two separate sets of
>>>> properties, one physical and one mental. Conscious experience is due to the mental
>>>> properties. The physical sciences have studied only the physical properties. The physical
>>>> sciences study macroscopic properties like "temperature" that are due to microscopic
>>>> properties such as the physical properties of particles. Chalmers advocates a science that
>>>> studies the "protophenomenal properties" of microscopic matter that can yield the
>>>> macroscopic phenomenon of consciousness. His parallel with electromagnetism is powerful.
>>>> Electromagnetism could not be explained by "reducing" electromagnetic phenomena to the
>>>> known properties of matter: it was explained when scientists introduced a whole new set of
>>>> properties (and related laws), the properties of microscopic matter that yield the
>>>> macroscopic phenomenon of electromagnetism. Similarly, consciousness cannot be explained by
>>>> the physical laws of the known properties but requires a new set of "psychophysical" laws
>>>> that deal with "protophenomenal properties". Consciousness supervenes naturally on the
>>>> physical: the "psychophysical" laws will explain this supervenience, they will explain how
>>>> conscious experiences depend on physical processes. Chalmers emphasizes that this applies
>>>> only to consciousness. Cognition is governed by the known laws of the physical sciences.<<<
>>>>
>
> A lot of the stuff criticising Chalmer's thesis is quite strident, at least by the usual academic
> standards. It's not quite as severe as the reaction to Roger Penrose's theories on the mind, but
> almost. Many cognitive scientists seem to take anything not clearly straightforward materialism
> as automatically false or even nonsense. I sympathise with them to a degree: I think we should
> push materialism and reductionism as far as we can. But the inescapable fact remains, I could
> know every empirical fact about a conscious system, but still have no idea what it is actually
> like to *be* that system, as it were from the inside.
That's commonly said, but is it really true? Even without knowing anything about another person's
brain you have a lot ideas about what it is like to be that person. Suppose you really knew a lot
about an aritificial brain, as in a planetary probe for example, and you also knew a lot about your
own brain and to you could compare responses both at the behavoiral level and at the "brain" level.
I think you could infer a lot about what it was like to be that probe. You just couldn't directly
experience its experiences - but that's not suprising.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Fri Jul 21 2006 - 01:02:57 PDT