Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> >
> >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >
> >
> > > >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> > > >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> > > >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
> > > >hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non computationalist.
> > >
> > > Why would Chalmers' version of dualism be non-computationalist?
> >
> >That would depend on whether you are dealing with
> >consciousness-is-computation computationalism
> >or cognition-is-computation computationalism.
>
> Even with the consciousness-is-computation computationalism, it depends on
> what your definition of "is" is...if you understand it to mean that a
> conscious experience is nothing more than an alternate way of describing a
> certain computation, I suppose Chalmers would not be a "computationalist" in
> this sense, but if you just understand it to mean that the experience and
> the computation are inextricably linked then he still could be called a
> computationalist.
He goes to great lengths to explain the difference between
supervenience
and identity.
> > > As I
> > > understand him, he does argue that there is a one-to-one relationship
> > > between computations and conscious experiences,
> >
> >But not an identity relationship.
>
> But what if the one-to-one relationship is not understood to be contingent,
> i.e. the relationship between first-person qualia and third-person
> descriptions of computations is the same in all possible worlds?
That's supervenience under logical or natural laws.
> > > and he certainly believes
> > > that a sufficiently detailed simulation of a brain would *behave* just
> >like
> > > the original.
> >
> >But that is underpinned by psychophysical laws, not identity.
>
> If the psychophysical laws are a matter of necessary truth, I'm not sure
> this is a meaningful distinction...as an analogy, "1+1" being equal to "2"
> could be said to be underpinned by the laws of arithmetic, but if these laws
> are necessary ones, then isn't "1+1" also identical with "2"?
If you can't even express qualia mathemtically how
can you have a mathemtically necessary psychophysical law ?
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Received on Thu Jul 20 2006 - 18:27:40 PDT