Re: A calculus of personal identity

From: Brent Meeker <>
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2006 18:36:42 -0700

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP)
> > > I don't understand why you [Bruno Marchal] say
> >
> > "if duplication (at any level) is a death sentence, then comp is wrong".
> > > There must be a *minimal* level of duplication fidelity below which
> > > consciousness/intelligence is not preserved, no? Or are you using
> >
> > "duplication" to mean perfect duplication, in which case how can we have
> > > different levels of perfection?
> >
> >
> I[f] we actually tried duplication, then as in all communication technologies, there would be errors
> >
> and the duplication would not be perfect. But then the question arises, could the duplicate have
> >
> all the memories and personality of the original but still not "feel" that he was the same person?
> >
> In other words he would be a perfect duplicate from the 3rd person viewpoint, except that he would
> > say he was not.
> If the duplicate did not feel he was the original, then he wouldn't have
> "all the memories and personality of the original", would he?

Well that's the question isn't it. Is there something besides memories and personality that makes
you you. Could you feel that your memories belonged to somebody else? I think that no duplication
is going to be perfect - it's just a question of whether the difference will be detectable with
reasonable effort. If one remembers having a green pencil in the first grade and the other
remembers having a blue one, how could anyone know which is right?

Brent Meeker

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Received on Mon Jun 26 2006 - 21:37:46 PDT

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