RE: Re: A calculus of personal identity

From: Stathis Papaioannou <>
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2006 10:36:49 +1000

Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP)
> > I don't understand why you [Bruno Marchal] say > > "if duplication (at any level) is a death sentence, then comp is wrong". > > There must be a *minimal* level of duplication fidelity below which > > consciousness/intelligence is not preserved, no? Or are you using > > "duplication" to mean perfect duplication, in which case how can we have > > different levels of perfection? > > I[f] we actually tried duplication, then as in all communication technologies, there would be errors > and the duplication would not be perfect. But then the question arises, could the duplicate have > all the memories and personality of the original but still not "feel" that he was the same person? > In other words he would be a perfect duplicate from the 3rd person viewpoint, except that he would > say he was not.
If the duplicate did not feel he was the original, then he wouldn't have "all the memories and personality of the original", would he? We could qualify this: perhaps the knowledge that he was a duplicate might make him wonder if he were the same person, and in an extreme situation might even drive him crazy. In that case, the appropriate experiment would be to tell neither the original nor the duplicate who was who, rather like having a placebo control in a drug trial. If there is still a significant difference between duplicate and original, the duplication process isn't accurate enough.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Jun 26 2006 - 20:37:52 PDT

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