L'esprit de l'escalier:
after reading my post below as an interesting
list-post it occurred that I left out an important
addage:
I may feel as the same person (self) in my earlier
life and situations - I do not IDENTIFY with 'it'. I
know: "it is me" but not "I am like that". Not even:
"I was like that" - I observe it as an interesting
book I read already. Or something thelike.
Just to add to the happy misunderstanding
John M
--- John M <jamikes.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> I read the remark of Russell and Satathis's reply
> with
> great interest.
> Russell wrote (among others):
> *
> > > ...The change into
> > > Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as
> > >one would have to
> > > pass through non-functional brain structures in
> > >order to change from me to him.< <
> *
> reflecting a rather mechanistic-physicalist view of
> a
> mentality in 'degrees' followable by (not
> substantial?) alterations from a (nonfunctioning,
> but
> assumed?) prior state, I would suggest: in
> infinitesimal steps as in the well esstablished
> qualia
> of calculus. Russell seems to disagree, taking the
> analog view (in kind).
> Let me return to this after 2 quotes from Stathis's
> reply:
> *
> 1. > However, technical feasibility is not the
> >point.
> >The point is that *if*
> > (let's say magically) your mind were gradually
> > transformed, so that your
> > thoughts became more and more Napoleonic and less
> > and less Standishian,
> > then by this process, you would become Napoleon.
> *
> 2. >...the old man remembers being a young
> > man, the young man
> > remembers being a child, but the old man does not
> > remember being a
> > child. Although the old man has no recollection of
> > being a child, he
> > still identifies as being the same person as that
> > child because there is
> > a continuous series of intermediates each of whom
> > recalls the one
> > immediately prior, if not the ones several stages
> > earlier.
> *
> Comparing the two I find Russell's position more
> mentality-oriented than Stathis' (more mechanistic),
> however he mentions Parfit's "personal identity"
> tested in thought-experiments. (I dislike thought
> experiments as artefacts composed to rationalize
> upon
> one's not so rational ideas into a fabricated sci-fi
> situation.)
>
> The personal identity (I call it: SELF?) is an open
> question. The old man identifies himself with all
> stages of his earlier life even if episodes emerge
> he
> did not actively remember. (I know, I do). It is
> more
> than stepping backwards in phases. It transcends
> time,
> particular qualia-attributes, rationale and
> approval.
> I identify (an arthritic octagenerian) with the teen
> youngster who made that memorable ski-jump. I feel
> it... also the frustration when at school I was not
> prepared and could not recite the poem which I now
> know quite well.
> Self is more than 'degrees of bodily, emotionally or
> mentally experienced states', it is "myself in total
> ambiance" (a situation psych cannot handle and
> physics
> has no units to measure). It does not end by the
> skin
> and not by personal thoughts. It includes a
> complexity
> of the 'situations' without transition of
> "yesterday's
> me" into Napoleon. Triggered? yes. Explained? not
> yet.
>
> (My problem with MWI transitions of Q-suicide ideas:
>
> what part of 'SELF' are we talking about? it
> includes
> the totality as e/affecting us (and vice versa),
> very
> much as THIS universe circumstances and in another
> ambiance the same 'self' is not identifiable. Same
> question as in reincarnation: who is "I"
> reincarnated?) Self is a mentally interrelated part
> of
> the totality with some inside reflection to itself
> (no
> good words available). Sort of a duality? Relational
> compolsition?
> It works in all of us, I have no idea if less
> neuronic
> animals have it (never asked them) or plants,
> galaxies?
>
> Besides: 'self' related things go atemporal -
> aspatial.
> Not followable in time-series or state-space series.
> It is not analysably changing details from A-C
> through
> B.
> It is - well, who knows? - a (complex) quality-jump
> in
> some 'analog'(?) manner, if we think comp.
> I still do not know HOW to think about it.
>
> John M
>
>
>
>
> --- Stathis Papaioannou
> <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> >
> > Russell Standish writes:
> >
> > > >Even though it is very unlikely to happen in
> > reality, it is easy
> > > > enough to imagine that the relatively minor
> > physical/psychological
> > > > changes that have occurred in the past day are
> > exaggerated, so that
> > > > instead of changing from me-yesterday to
> > me-today, I change from
> > > > me-yesterday into Napoleon. The point is that
> > this type of radical
> > > > change would be different in *degree*, not
> > different in kind from
> > the
> > > > type of change that occurs normally. One could
> > even argue that
> > turning
> > >
> > > Sure, but that's exactly where I'm in
> > disagreement. The change into
> > > Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as
> > one would have to
> > > pass through non-functional brain structures in
> > order to change from
> > me to
> > > him. Whereas to change from me to me as I was
> > twenty years ago can be
> > > achieved by passing through functional brain
> > structures (all the
> > > instances of me over the last twenty years).
> >
> > I don't see why you are so sure about the
> necessity
> > of passing through
> > non-functional brain structures going from you to
> > Napoleon. After all,
> > there is a continuous sequence of intermediates
> > between you and a
> > fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have
> much
> > more in common
> > mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a
> > fertilized ovum.
> > However, technical feasibility is not the point.
> The
> > point is that *if*
> > (let's say magically) your mind were gradually
> > transformed, so that your
> > thoughts became more and more Napoleonic and less
> > and less Standishian,
> > then by this process, you would become Napoleon.
> It
> > is analogous to the
> > situation where the old man remembers being a
> young
> > man, the young man
> > remembers being a child, but the old man does not
> > remember being a
> > child. Although the old man has no recollection of
> > being a child, he
> > still identifies as being the same person as that
> > child because there is
> > a continuous series of intermediates each of whom
> > recalls the one
> > immediately prior, if not the ones several stages
> > earlier. This is what
> > people actually believe and act on, for example if
> a
> > person is found
> > guilty of a crime which he has since genuinely
> > forgotten committing. The
> > whole thrust of Parfit's philosophizing involves
> > taking such normative
> > definitions of personal identity and, by trying
> them
> > out in various
>
=== message truncated ===
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list-unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Mon May 29 2006 - 07:50:36 PDT