I read the remark of Russell and Satathis's reply with
great interest.
Russell wrote (among others):
*
> > ...The change into
> > Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as
> >one would have to
> > pass through non-functional brain structures in
> >order to change from me to him.< <
*
reflecting a rather mechanistic-physicalist view of a
mentality in 'degrees' followable by (not
substantial?) alterations from a (nonfunctioning, but
assumed?) prior state, I would suggest: in
infinitesimal steps as in the well esstablished qualia
of calculus. Russell seems to disagree, taking the
analog view (in kind).
Let me return to this after 2 quotes from Stathis's
reply:
*
1. > However, technical feasibility is not the >point.
>The point is that *if*
> (let's say magically) your mind were gradually
> transformed, so that your
> thoughts became more and more Napoleonic and less
> and less Standishian,
> then by this process, you would become Napoleon.
*
2. >...the old man remembers being a young
> man, the young man
> remembers being a child, but the old man does not
> remember being a
> child. Although the old man has no recollection of
> being a child, he
> still identifies as being the same person as that
> child because there is
> a continuous series of intermediates each of whom
> recalls the one
> immediately prior, if not the ones several stages
> earlier.
*
Comparing the two I find Russell's position more
mentality-oriented than Stathis' (more mechanistic),
however he mentions Parfit's "personal identity"
tested in thought-experiments. (I dislike thought
experiments as artefacts composed to rationalize upon
one's not so rational ideas into a fabricated sci-fi
situation.)
The personal identity (I call it: SELF?) is an open
question. The old man identifies himself with all
stages of his earlier life even if episodes emerge he
did not actively remember. (I know, I do). It is more
than stepping backwards in phases. It transcends time,
particular qualia-attributes, rationale and approval.
I identify (an arthritic octagenerian) with the teen
youngster who made that memorable ski-jump. I feel
it... also the frustration when at school I was not
prepared and could not recite the poem which I now
know quite well.
Self is more than 'degrees of bodily, emotionally or
mentally experienced states', it is "myself in total
ambiance" (a situation psych cannot handle and physics
has no units to measure). It does not end by the skin
and not by personal thoughts. It includes a complexity
of the 'situations' without transition of "yesterday's
me" into Napoleon. Triggered? yes. Explained? not yet.
(My problem with MWI transitions of Q-suicide ideas:
what part of 'SELF' are we talking about? it includes
the totality as e/affecting us (and vice versa), very
much as THIS universe circumstances and in another
ambiance the same 'self' is not identifiable. Same
question as in reincarnation: who is "I"
reincarnated?) Self is a mentally interrelated part of
the totality with some inside reflection to itself (no
good words available). Sort of a duality? Relational
compolsition?
It works in all of us, I have no idea if less neuronic
animals have it (never asked them) or plants,
galaxies?
Besides: 'self' related things go atemporal -
aspatial.
Not followable in time-series or state-space series.
It is not analysably changing details from A-C through
B.
It is - well, who knows? - a (complex) quality-jump in
some 'analog'(?) manner, if we think comp.
I still do not know HOW to think about it.
John M
--- Stathis Papaioannou
<stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > >Even though it is very unlikely to happen in
> reality, it is easy
> > > enough to imagine that the relatively minor
> physical/psychological
> > > changes that have occurred in the past day are
> exaggerated, so that
> > > instead of changing from me-yesterday to
> me-today, I change from
> > > me-yesterday into Napoleon. The point is that
> this type of radical
> > > change would be different in *degree*, not
> different in kind from
> the
> > > type of change that occurs normally. One could
> even argue that
> turning
> >
> > Sure, but that's exactly where I'm in
> disagreement. The change into
> > Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as
> one would have to
> > pass through non-functional brain structures in
> order to change from
> me to
> > him. Whereas to change from me to me as I was
> twenty years ago can be
> > achieved by passing through functional brain
> structures (all the
> > instances of me over the last twenty years).
>
> I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity
> of passing through
> non-functional brain structures going from you to
> Napoleon. After all,
> there is a continuous sequence of intermediates
> between you and a
> fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much
> more in common
> mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a
> fertilized ovum.
> However, technical feasibility is not the point. The
> point is that *if*
> (let's say magically) your mind were gradually
> transformed, so that your
> thoughts became more and more Napoleonic and less
> and less Standishian,
> then by this process, you would become Napoleon. It
> is analogous to the
> situation where the old man remembers being a young
> man, the young man
> remembers being a child, but the old man does not
> remember being a
> child. Although the old man has no recollection of
> being a child, he
> still identifies as being the same person as that
> child because there is
> a continuous series of intermediates each of whom
> recalls the one
> immediately prior, if not the ones several stages
> earlier. This is what
> people actually believe and act on, for example if a
> person is found
> guilty of a crime which he has since genuinely
> forgotten committing. The
> whole thrust of Parfit's philosophizing involves
> taking such normative
> definitions of personal identity and, by trying them
> out in various
> irregular situations and thought experiments,
> showing up their
> deficiencies.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
>
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Received on Mon May 29 2006 - 07:37:41 PDT