Re: Numbers

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2006 15:43:32 +0200

Le 25-mars-06, à 23:13, 1Z a écrit :


> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 25-mars-06, à 19:17, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>>>>> You will miss the consequences of the assumption. All science is
>>>>>> based
>>>>>> on implicit or explicit assumption, related to (non definable)
>>>>>> world-views.
>
>>>>> Almost all science is based on the implicit assumption of a
>>>>> "stuffy"
>>>>> world view.
>
>>>> No. This is a simplifying methodological assumption, but there is no
>>>> evidence it is necessary. Few physicists use it.
>
>>> I can assure you that real-life physicsists do use it.
>>
>> Give reference please.
>
> Typing "physics matter" into google produces 108,000,000 hits...
>
> http://www.google.co.uk/search?
> hl=en&q=physics+matter&btnG=Google+Search&meta=
>
> ...happy reading.


Didn't find the reference. Nor even with "assumption mater". You help
me to realize that physicist never assume the existence of primitive
matter, nor do they postulate it with the notable exception of
Aristotle, and of those moderns who show that a boolean conception of
matter is contradicted by the facts and/or the QM theory. In the
meantime if you can find a more circumscribed set of references ...
Actually I find the word "matter" more vague and ill-defined than
consciousness, and I believe the "matter hard problem" is harder than
the so-called hard problem of consciousness. I will not explained given
that this is exactly what I have make precise through the comp
postulate.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Received on Mon Mar 27 2006 - 08:44:36 PST

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