Re: belief, faith, truth

From: danny mayes <>
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2006 23:50:54 -0500

Going back to the discussion a few days ago, I agree with the value of
the UDA as an idea worthy of development, as you are doing. In fact it
seems to be the only idea on the table that I'm aware of that provides
some explanation for the 1-indeterminacy of QM and also gives insight
into why the most elegant or simplest explanations of observations in
nature tend to be the correct explanations.
My earlier suggestion regarding the popularity of your ideas was not
intended to be a criticism. To the extent I understand you I find
myself in agreement with many of your ideas.
Regarding the view of everything as mathematical object, it seems this
has an element of truth to me, but it also seems to possibly miss
something important. As Hawking said, what is it that breathes fire
into the equations?

Perhaps a better view is the reduction of everything to information,
versus mathematical object, as some have suggested in recent
publications? A quick search for a definition of information came up
with this: 1) that which reduces uncertainty. <UNCERTAINTY.html>
(Claude Shannon); 2) that which changes us. (Gregory Bateson).
Interesting in this context, maybe, to look at it that way. The view of
everything in the context of information perhaps leaves open the role of
intelligence/consciousness in a fundamental explanation.


Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Hi John,
> If I remember correctly Robert Rosen does not accept Church Thesis.
> This explains some fundamental difference of what we mean respectively
> by "machine".
> I use the term for digitalizable machine, which, with Church thesis,
> is equivalent with "programs", or with anything a computer can
> imitate. With Church thesis all computer (universal machine) are
> equivalent and can emulate (simulate perfectly) each other.
> The machine I talk about are mathematical object in Platonia. I never
> use machine in the materialist sense of something having some body to
> act in a environment, because my goal is to find out why immaterial
> machine in Platonia are confronted with stable appearance of materiality.
> I hope this can help a little bit,
> Best,
> Bruno
> Le 17-févr.-06, à 21:27, John M a écrit :
>> <snip>
>> Now a silly point: after so much back and forth about
>> 'machines' and our best efforts to grasp what we
>> should understand, would it be asking too much to
>> re-include a BRIEF identification about the way YOU
>> use the term? (Never mind Loeb).
>> It would help me for sure. I could not decipher it
>> from the quoted URLs (yours included),
>> <snip>
>> Lately on the Rosen-list Robert Rosen's 'machine' term
>> got so mixed up that my understanding what I developed
>> some 5-6 years ago got mixed up. It is different from
>> yours, which just adds to the confusion. Yours is also
>> going on over at least 2-3 years.
Received on Mon Feb 20 2006 - 23:51:13 PST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:11 PST