Re: Artificial Philosophizing

From: <daddycaylor.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 15:58:35 -0500

Bruno:
>>> That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning =
>>> provability = Bp = Beweisbar("p") cf Godel 1931. Soul =
>>> first person = provability-and-truth = Bp & p =
>>> third Plotinus' hypostase. This can look as an oversimplification
>>> but the gap between truth and provability (incarnated in the
>>> corona G* minus G) detrivialises (if I can say) all this.
>>>

Tom:
>> ...
>> On the contrary, I would echo John Mikes' sentiment that
>> some of your definitions seem too simple for my taste.
>> I think I would agree with your definition of reasoning
>> though, but I take issue with your definition of Soul =
>> first person = provability-and-truth = Bp & p. I think
>> elsewhere you also define Knowledge as Belief & Truth,
>> and I have the same problem with that. These definitions
>> seem too simple. These seem equivalent to accidental
>> true belief and accidental true proof. They lack the
>> justification factor. (I feel a reference to G*/G coming. ;) )
>> Anyway, perhaps we can start a new thread if we want
>> to talk about this part some more, or this is probably what
>> you've been trying to explain to us all along in previous threads.

Bruno:
> Bp & p seems too simple. Actually, given that I limit myself
> in the interview of sound machines, we know that they obey
> to Bp -> p, by definition (a sound machine proves only true
> statements: so Bp -> p).
> So we know Bp and Bp & p are equivalent, so you could at

I should have said that Bp & p seems wrong, not that it's too simple.
I was trying to say that it seems wrong to say that Bp & p gets us
further than Bp, i.e. provability + truth is more than provability. In
order for Bp & p > Bp, it seems to me that we would have to have access
to truth (p) directly, we would have to *know* that we've proved
something to be true, not just that we've been consistent. In order to
be *sound* we have to be given "true truth" for our reasoning to start
with (and then of course be then be consistent with it). This is
similar to why I don't think that knowledge is simply true belief.

Bruno:
> first believe that the soul = the intellect. Exercise: what is wrong?
> Answer tomorrow :-) (+ answers to Danny and Ben).
>
> Bruno

I don't know what you're trying to get at with soul = intellect. To me
the intellect is simply at the same par with provability and reason.
The intellect has to be given true truth in order for it to come up
with true truth (if it reasons consistently). More than that, the
intellect has to be given true truth and know that it was given true
truth, in order to reason its way to more true truth and know that it
has done so.

Tom
Received on Thu Feb 16 2006 - 16:41:21 PST