Re: Artificial Philosophizing

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 19:19:13 +0100

Le 16-févr.-06, à 19:02, a écrit :

> Responses interspersed below.
> Le 15-févr.-06, à 17:30, a écrit : 
>>> As Bruno said, now we really don't know what a machine is. 
> Bruno:
>> Actually I was just saying that no machine can *fully* grasp *all
> aspect* of machine. But machines can know what machines are. Only, if
> a machine M1 is more complex than M2, M2 will not been able to prove
> the consistency of M1, for example. And then if we are machine (comp)
> such limitations apply to us, and this provides lot of informations,
> including negative one which we can not prove except that we can
> derive them from the initial comp act of faith ("yes doctor"). 
> Actually I was referring to what you said in the "belief..." thread
> where you respond to my statement
>>> This runs counter to the whole PHILOSOPHY (mind you)
>>> of modern science, that we are simply machines, and that
>>> there is no WHY.
> with:
>> This is due to the materialist who like to use the idea
>> that we are simply machine just to put under the rug
>> all the interesting open problem of (platonician) theology.
>> Since Godel's discovery this position is untenable.

>> Now we
>> know that we don't know really what machines are.

OK. Really my fault. I write too quickly. I should have written "Now we
don't know really what machines are CAPABLE OF".
Somehow we can have complete knowledge of the machine thrid person
description and also of its local functioning, but even for simple
machine we cannot in general predict their long term behaviors.

>> With
>> the comp-or-weaker hyp, we already know that if we are
>> machine then the physical laws emerges from in a totally
>> precise and testable way.
> Tom: 
>>> So in the absense of a precise definition, perhaps we end up running
> away from ill-defined words like "machine", "reason", "soul", "faith",
> etc., for who knows what personal "reasons". 
> Bruno:
>> That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning = provability =
> Bp = Beweisbar("p") cf Godel 1931. Soul = first person =
> provability-and-truth = Bp & p = third Plotinus' hypostase. This can
> look as an oversimplification but the gap between truth and
> provability (incarnated in the corona G* minus G) detrivialises (if I
> can say) all this. 
>> My fault. I will come back on this. 
>> Bruno 
> Actually, when I was talking about a lack of precise definition, I
> wasn't referring to you, Bruno. I was talking about what happens in
> the general conversation when we don't define our terms, or when we
> are assuming different definitions based on different philosophies
> consciously or unconsciously held.
> On the contrary, I would echo John Mikes' sentiment that some of your
> definitions seem too simple for my taste. I think I would agree with
> your definition of reasoning though, but I take issue with your
> definition of Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp & p. I
> think elsewhere you also define Knowledge as Belief & Truth, and I
> have the same problem with that. These definitions seem too simple.
> These seem equivalent to accidental true belief and accidental true
> proof. They lack the justification factor. (I feel a reference to
> G*/G coming. ;) ) Anyway, perhaps we can start a new thread if we
> want to talk about this part some more, or this is probably what
> you've been trying to explain to us all along in previous threads.

Bp & p seems too simple. Actually, given that I limit myself in the
interview of sound machines, we know that they obey to Bp -> p, by
definition (a sound machine proves only true statements: so Bp -> p).
So we know Bp and Bp & p are equivalent, so you could at first believe
that the soul = the intellect. Exercise: what is wrong?
Answer tomorrow :-) (+ answers to Danny and Ben).

Received on Thu Feb 16 2006 - 14:25:48 PST

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