>>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception is
indirect, and therefore the existance of a material cause for those
perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's razor.
The argument that the look, texture, smell, taste and sound of an object are
apprehended indirectly is successful in my opinion, and I dont feel any need
to defend it unless someone really thinks a defence is required. Aterall, on
any view there is a translation of 'signals' of many different forms (light
waves, sound waves) , into various 'signals' of the same form (neurons
firing) which become synaesthetically unified into a whole, such that we
associate the smell, taste, colour and texture of say an orange, as being
qualities of the same object. That kicking a rock hurts, for example, does
not establish that the 'material world' is apprehended directly, or that the
concept of a material world is anything more than an inference.
I dont think this is really what Johnson meant, but the only challenge his
'refutation' genuinely offers is with regards to extension. How is the size
of an object, or its ability to exist and move (by being kicked) in a 3
dimensional realm, derived from perception alone? Our grasp of a 3
dimensional world is dependent on our stereoscopic perception. Its only when
there are two seperate perceptions of the world of the same type (eg. left
and right eye) that we apprehend a properly 3 dimensionally world, each of
these perceptions is however intrinsically 2 dimensional. It is the mental
combination of these slightly different images from which we derive an
extended world. This is probably more controversial, but Berkley's move here
is to insist that it we have enough information now to create the appearance
of a 3 dimensional world out of elements that are not intrinsically
extended. By Occam then, we should not infer something for which there is no
requirement - however firmly that inference has been imbedded in us. We
should stick to using what we can know directly. Perception.
In otherwords, dualists and materialists contravene Occam, not idealists. i
dont see how Johnson refuted that.
regards.
>From: "Lee Corbin" <lcorbin.domain.name.hidden>
>Reply-To: <lcorbin.domain.name.hidden>
>To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
>Subject: What We Can Know About the World
>Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2005 02:19:49 -0700
>
>Stathis writes
>
> > > When 99% of the human race use the word "reality", they mean
> > > the world outside their skins.
> > >
> > > If you sacrifice our common understanding of "reality", then
> > > you'll find yourself in a hole out of which you'll never climb.
> >
> > Yes, but what *is* this 3D world we can all stub our toe on?
>
>Korzybski would warn: beware the "is" of identity :-)
>
> > If we go back to the start of last century, Rutherford's
> > quaintly pre-QM atom, amazingly, turned out to be mostly
> > empty space. Did this mean that, suddenly, it doesn't hurt
> > when you walk into a brick wall, because it isn't nearly as
> > solid as you initially thought it was? Of course not; our
> > experience of the world is one thing, and the "reality"
> > behind the experience is a completely different thing.
>
>That's *exactly* right. We *could* have been designed by
>evolution not to hurt when we walked into a wall. For certain
>reasons, we were not designed that way.
>
> > If it is discovered tomorrow beyond any doubt that the
> > entire universe is just a game running in the down time
> > on God's pocket calculator, how is this fundamentally
> > different to discovering that, contrary to appearances,
> > atoms are mostly empty space, or subatomic particles have
> > no definite position, or any other weird theory of modern
> > physics?
>
>Good analogy! The world surprises us all the time, especially
>the more we learn about it. It would be bizarre if it did not,
>(we'd probably have to abandon most of our theories).
>
> > And how could, say, the fact that brick walls feel solid enough
> > possibly count as evidence against such an anti-realist theory?
>
>Occam's razor. We go with the simplest theory. Imagine
>that you and I believe we are standing next to a wall.
>Our conjecture is that it has certain properties. We
>may need it to protect us. If we're wrong, nature will
>make short work of us. That we have survived this long
>is a strong indication that the wall really is there.
>In fact, on some level of practicality, it is foolish
>to debate the existence of the wall. Samuel Johnson
>did refute Berkeley.
>
>Lee
>
_________________________________________________________________
Be the first to hear what's new at MSN - sign up to our free newsletters!
http://www.msn.co.uk/newsletters
Received on Wed Jul 27 2005 - 09:57:12 PDT