Le 09-mai-05, à 00:13, Lee Corbin wrote (FOR list)
> Bruno writes
>
>> Le 07-mai-05, à 09:33, Bill Taylor a écrit :
>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>> COMP has three parts:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>
> ...
>>> 3) The assumption, in cognitive science, that there is
>>> a level of description of my parts (whatever I
>>> consider myself to be) such that I would not be
>>> aware of any experiential change if a functionally
>>> correct digital substitution is done of my parts
>>> at that level.
>>>
>>> <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
>>> but that (3) is highly dubious, being a pious hope
>>> rather than anything supported by evidence.
>>
>> I could agree with you. My point is that it is non trivial,
>> due to incompleteness, and that it is amenable to experimental
>> and mathematical scrutiny.
>
> Your aim has been, and for all I know you have succeeded, in
> placing this beyond the reach of philosophy (in a certain sense)
> and trying to place it all on a firm mathematical foundation.
> Good luck.
Thanks. That's an important point. My original goal was just to show to
scientist that the so-called "Mind-Body problem" is just not yet
solved, and that it is amenable to verifiable Popperian scientist
formulation.
>
> But as a merely philosophic claim, it has, like I was saying,
> an old pedigree.
Absolutely. I have found prechristian indian text reasoning quite
rigorously on "comp". It's also in Chineese taoist text (Tchoang Tseu,
Lie Tseu). It is as old as tools ...
>
> By the way, Bill does not seem to have stated so explicitly,
> but isn't it also a part of your claim---a vital part---that
> we're just bit strings in Platonia, nothing more,
That is a slightly misleading way to put the things. Obviously I am not
a string of bit (with I = "my first person view")
nor am I a collection of interacting particle ... All that are third
person view (the first in platonia, the second in physics ...). As I
said, the 1 person is not reductible to any 3-person view. But with the
comp hyp made explicit, by some "meta-reasoning" it is possible to
associate a quite explicit logic on machine explaining the existence of
those things which have no 3-person description (but yet
"meta-describable" through the comp hyp). This is related to subtle
feature of machine self-reference.
> nothing
> less, and that our good old 3D universe operating through
> time really reduces to Platonia, and to bit strings without
> *activity* (the latter depending for its meaning on *time*)?
>
> That latter point is all that I have a problem with, the
> above claims 1, 2, and 3 all seeming unexceptional.
The utimate 3-view is indeed probably static (but once things are
technical you will see that there are many open problems). We will come
back on this.
Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Mon May 09 2005 - 06:12:01 PDT