Re: many worlds theory of immortality: May only be the Anthropic Principle

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2005 09:14:13 +0200

Hi Stephen,

You wrote:

> <snip ... (I am ignoring my own allergy to the idea that 1st
person aspects
> can be faithfully represented by Turing algorithms.) ...>


I take the opportunity of that statement to insist on a key point which
is admittedly not obvious.
The fact is that I am also totally allergic to the idea that 1st person
aspects can be represented. Comma.
And that is the main reason I appreciate the computational hypothesis;
it prevents the existence of any
such representation. This is a consequence of two things:

1) The first person possesses an unbreakable umbilical chord with truth
(it is related to what is called "knowledge incorrigibility");
2) by Tarski theorem the concept of truth on a machine cannot be
represented in any way in the machine.

In particular if we define (a little bit contra Rafe Champion(for-list)
knowledge of p by [provability of p] + [truth of p] (more or less
Theaetetus' definition),
although provability and knowledge can be shown to be "third person"
equivalent, they can also be shown first person NOT equivalent.

I even think that the comp hyp, thanks to incompleteness, is the most
powerful vaccine ever find against any attempt to reduce a first person
to any third person notion, and this in a third person communicable
way. This makes me optimistic for the long run ...

Best regards,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Thu Apr 28 2005 - 03:18:18 PDT

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