Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"

From: John M <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2005 17:18:13 -0400

<Stathis> wrote:
> A person's decisions and actions must either follow
deterministically from a set of rules (which at bottom must reduce to the
laws of physics, whatever these ultimately turn out to be), or else they
must be random; what other possibility is there?...<
[JM]:
The inaccuracy of the paranthesis-statement. There is more to be learned
(discovered, experienced, adding to our knowledge-base) than those
observations and their explanations we usually call 'physics' or any other
name. Your word "ultimately" points to this concern very decently. You
have the right to call the 'ultimate' (never attainable?) epistemic
cognitive
inventory "PHYSICS" (based on the origin of this word), but most people
will take it as the limited subject in ongoing college curricula.
<St>:
>Certainly, when I make a
> decision it doesn't *feel* as if I am bound by any absolute deterministic
> rules, nor does it feel as if I am being driven by a random number
> generator. But if I think about it seriously, it is clear that this is
> what must actually be happening.<
[JM]:
I deny the 'random number generator' part, but I agree with your point that
 "what I feel" is irrelevant. There are unconscious motives in the mindset.
There are 'hidden' variables and 'not yet discovered' inputs, we cannot give
full account of all that is going on in our mind (incl. decisions?).
The 'random' IMO comes from the unkown part of the world, just as the
"chaotic", once our epistemic enrichment discloses those "rules?" (parts)
that explain the process leading to either random or chaotic, they cease to
be such and are included in the orderly and understandable.

In your reply to Russell you wrote:
<St>:
.... it seems to me that in the brain both types of "random" event would
combine to give a very complex and unpredictable picture indeed: quantum
events at the atomic or subatomic scale would be amplified by chaotic
interactions at the classical scale. However, I have seen it stated that
quantum events would in fact not be significant at the scale of neuronal
processes. Which is correct? And does it really make much difference,
whether we are talking truly random or intractably pseudo-random?
[JM]:
Your doubts are well taken. The stage, when some 'model-views' led to the
QM-based considerations, includes no indications that there is nothing else.
In fact, the missing transition between "physical measurements" vs (true?)
ORIGINATION of mental content (NOT the correlations between such
 occurrencies!) postulates the 'more significant' factors you are missing.
We
are talking in our limited models and their explanations, based on levels of
(epistemic) information which during the eras when our scientific concepts
were developed was by far not sufficient to understand e.g. mentality. It
is still not sufficient and this calls for considerations of randomness,
chaos,
indeterministic and emergent marvels. (Religions included).
The unpredicatbility stems from the total interaction of factors not only so
far unaccountable, but a (potential) full combination of the unlimited 'all'
is
exceeding our mental capabilities.

John M



----- Original Message -----
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
To: <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Cc: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2005 9:26 PM
Subject: Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"


> John Mikes wrote:
>
>
> >The question of (in)determinacy within our judgement is model-related. A
> >distinction:
> >"..."free will" to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate
> >choices..." is as well the judgement of reasonability in our limited
views.
> >There may be (hidden? undiscovered?) 'reasons' that make us choose a
> >(seemingly) "unreasonable" decision.
> >
> >To Statis' question I don't pretend to have "The Answer", :
> >"...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising
> >*genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which
clearly
> >I have no control over?"
> > but a consideration may go like this:
> >our mind is interrelated to the rest of the totality (wholeness) and
stores
> >individually different mindsets as a result of memory and ideation
> >(genetically + personal history-wise modified).
> >The 'mind' (what is it? self, memories, etc., I say: the mental ASPECT of
> >our complexity)
> >is not a sole function of the brain-tissues which are only the tools
> >working WITH it. There is no 'mystery' in this statement: only our
> >ignorance preventing to discover things beyond our present models by our
> >physical and physiological observational (and explanatory) skills.
> >At the level of complexness in our mind-state we have choices. Not
freely,
> >but definitely 'ways' to compare and choose. "We are free" means we can
> >choose the route that fits most the combined image of our mental state at
> >the moment. We are "free" to choose otherwise, again, deterministically
by
> >the background(s) we consciously know or don't. No matter if
> >it looks 'reasonable' for others, ot not. Statis is right to feel not
> >responsible for such choices - only religions impart such guilt-feeling
to
> >keep the flock under control.
> >
> >Since the actions are deemed (in)deterministic in both 'conscious(?)' and
> >'inanimate(?)' units, it points to our ignorance about the functional
> >originations for them. The unlimited interconnections with their
> >differential efficiency on the different targets that makes the wholistic
> >interconnection of the totality incalculable (not prone to Turing-Chuch
> >application) gives us the feeling of a free will, of indeterminacy,
> >earlier: of a miracle and awe.
> >
> >I don't want to even guess how much we did not yet discover.
>
> Just to clarify, my request for a method to distinguish "genuine" free
will
> from the "pseudo-free" variety (deterministic or random) was
> tongue-in-cheek. A person's decisions and actions must either follow
> deterministically from a set of rules (which at bottom must reduce to the
> laws of physics, whatever these ultimately turn out to be), or else they
> must be random; what other possibility is there? Certainly, when I make a
> decision it doesn't *feel* as if I am bound by any absolute deterministic
> rules, nor does it feel as if I am being driven by a random number
> generator. But if I think about it seriously, it is clear that this is
what
> must actually be happening.
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
Received on Wed Apr 13 2005 - 11:54:59 PDT