Re: "Free Will Theorem"

From: Hal Ruhl <>
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2005 09:56:10 -0400

In various places including a post in the All/Nothing multiverse thread:

I have defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.

I have been arguing that Turing's decision procedure result points towards
the multiverse being a countable set of world states rather than a continuum.

This is rather an argument from the particular to the general. Is it
perhaps better to look at the above definition of information as requiring
that the multiverse be a countable set of world states since a continuum
has no internal boundaries?

So the illusion of free will and consciousness I propose may follow from
the above definition as a truncation of "memory" when a world reality moves
through a series of states as I have been arguing from looking at Turing's

Received on Wed Apr 13 2005 - 10:06:23 PDT

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