Hello Hal,
>In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of
>information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a
>universe. The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world
>kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with the
>dynamic's past [to avoid the net information necessary to describe a
>structured dynamic - even a random one].
>
>This will produce sequences of world kernels [worlds] given physical
>reality that permit the continuation of large kernel sub components from
>kernel to kernel. Some of these sequences could be such that the entire
>kernels and the sequence of such could be properly emulated by a Turing
>machine. This however is not the same as the Turing machine emulating the
>entire evolution of that world since the dynamic that establishes the
>emulable sequence can terminate its emulability [or even just switch
>machines] without regard to the state of the emulating Turing machine.
>
>For this reason I must currently reject "Schmidhuber Comp: The universe
>is computable/Turing emulable."
>
>Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of
>the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.
?
>So I find I must also reject "..." "Comp: I (you) am (are)
>computable/Turing emulable."
I have no problem with that; but your phrasing is too fuzzy for me to
follow the reason why you reject both Schmidhuber and the "personal-comp".
Do you really mean that your "theory" would made you say no to a doctor
presenting you an artificial brain (even with a very low substitution level
description of yourself) ?
Remember that my point is just that is we are machine then physics is 100%
derivable from computer science. (But even if we succeed to derive 100% of
physics from comp this would not be a proof that comp is true).
Regards,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Mon Jan 17 2005 - 09:50:13 PST