RE: Belief Statements

From: Hal Ruhl <HalRuhl.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2005 13:16:17 -0500

Hi Bruno:

In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of
information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a
universe. The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world
kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with the
dynamic's past [to avoid the net information necessary to describe a
structured dynamic - even a random one].

This will produce sequences of world kernels [worlds] given physical
reality that permit the continuation of large kernel sub components from
kernel to kernel. Some of these sequences could be such that the entire
kernels and the sequence of such could be properly emulated by a Turing
machine. This however is not the same as the Turing machine emulating the
entire evolution of that world since the dynamic that establishes the
emulable sequence can terminate its emulability [or even just switch
machines] without regard to the state of the emulating Turing machine.

For this reason I must currently reject "Schmidhuber Comp: The universe
is computable/Turing emulable."

Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of
the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.

So I find I must also reject "..." "Comp: I (you) am (are)
computable/Turing emulable."

Yours

Hal Ruhl


     
Received on Sun Jan 16 2005 - 13:18:59 PST