Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

From: Georges Quenot <Georges.Quenot.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2004 11:36:43 +0100

Hal Ruhl wrote:
>
> Hi George:

Hi Hal,

> At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
>
>> Hal Ruhl wrote:
>>>
>>> My use of these words is convenience only but my point is why should
>>> existence be so anemic as to prohibit the simultaneous presence of an
>>> All and a Nothing.
>>
>> The "prohibition" does not "come from" an anemia of existence
>> (as you suggest) but rather from the strength of nothing(ness),
>> at least in my view of things.

I am not sure I understand where we disagree (and even if we
really disagree) on this question of the "{something, nothing,
concept, existence}" question.

Even if we consider that defining something automatically
defines (a complementary) something else, this happens at the
concept level. It might well be that both defined concepts
simultaneously exists (say at least in the mind/brain of a
few humans beings) but this says noting about whether either
one or the other actually gets at something that would exist.

Even if the *concepts of* something (or all) and nothing do
need to exist simultaneously for any of them to exist, it
(obviously ?) does not follows that something (or all) and
nothing also needs to exist simultaneously (or even simply
makes sense in any absolute way).

Last but not least, what is the complementary concept of a
given concept is not that obvious. Let's consider the concept
of a "winged horse". Regardless of whether it actually gets
at something or not, it can be considered to be opposed to
"non winged horses" or to "winged things that are not horses"
rather that to "anything that is not a winged horses". In
set theory, a complementary of a set is always considered
only within a given larger set and never in any fully open
way (and there are well known and very good reasons for that
whatever common sense may say). Similarly, defining an all
or something in a fully open way is likely to be inconsistent.
The situation is different here from the case of the winged
horse and probably from all other cases and there is no reason
that common sense be still relevant (like in the set of all
sets paradox). This might be a case (possibly the only one)
in which defining/considering something does not automatically
make appear a complementary something (even simply at the
concept level).

>>> This would be an arbitrary truncation without reasonable justification.
>>
>> Just as the opposite.
>
> I provided a justification - a simple basis for evolving universes -
> which does not yet seem to have toppled.

It might be not so simple. I went through it and I still can't
figure what "evolving universes" might get at. Up to this point,
I did not find something that would sound to me as a (more)
reasonable justification. This may well comme from me.
What appears reasonable or not or what appears as an actual
justification or not is certainly very relative. Currently, I am
still in the process of trying to find some sense (in my view of
things) in what you are talking about (and/or of trying to
figure out what your view of things might be). *Not* to say it
necessarily hasn't.

Georges.
Received on Wed Nov 17 2004 - 05:39:32 PST