At 21:02 28/08/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>The paper cited below is consistent with the reductionist view that there
>must be a distinct brain state giving rise to each distinct mental state.
>"Whenever neurones A,B,C fire the subject experiences sensations X,Y,Z."
I agree (except that you assume some high level of description of the brain,
but what you say is compatible with comp, I don't need that assumption, I am
agnostic on the substitution level).
>To include the phenomenon of first person experience one could add:
>"...and only the subject whose neurones are thus firing can know directly
>what it feels like to experience X,Y,Z." I believe this is as much as it
>is possible for an empirical science to say about the mind-body problem.
100% OK. But then I illustrate (at least) that with some hypothesis you
can extract
theories which explain much more (matter and mind in particular). But the
experimental bets
you describe is always part of a "yes doctor" form of act of faith. Sure.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Sat Aug 28 2004 - 13:45:15 PDT