Re: First Person Frame of Reference

From: John M <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2004 11:44:09 -0400

Dear Bruno, you made my day.

your explanation which I asked for (> >I mean a short, concise plain
language identification.<<) is such that I even hesitate to
try to follow it.
I may post my formulation (of words) when I feel it good enough
for a list-scrutiny. (On consciousness see some words below).
Does you Mmmmhhhh mean your opposing opinion
(vs a Hhhhmmmm)?
Thanks for the trouble to write, I will try to extract of it whatever
echoes some understanding in my little mind.

John Mikes

PS. The e-mail battle against 'consciousness' was based upon the Tucson
conferences where thousands of scientists from dozens of countries could not
agree in defining it. My opinion was: it is a historical noumenon for some
mental idiom - from ages when the then epistemic level of the cognitive
inventory did not allow an intelligent formulation amd nowadays every author
includes an identification that fits his theory. It is still going on. I
volunteered a definition in total generalization (not sure if I still
totally agree):
"Acknowledgement of and response to information" not restricted
to humans, rather generalized to 'everything' (this was before my
participation in the 'everything' list) as a "pan-sensitivity". The
"response" may be activity, or just storage, unrestricted. Information I
coined as 'difference' accepted.
References? it was in many dozens of list-e-mails on I guess 8 diverse lists
over a decade. I my have most of them in the mess on my *hard* disk. (Hard
to find on it). - JM

----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruno Marchal" <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
To: "Everything List" <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2004 12:24 PM
Subject: Re: First Person Frame of Reference


> At 11:04 04/06/04 -0400, John M wrote:
> >Bruno, do we have an agreed-upon identification "what" to call an
> >observer? I may heve missed it on the list, if yes. Your post below
speaks
> >about the topic, but I don't see some conclusion: is it the
unformalizable
> >first person concept, is it upon formal, or nonformal considerations? Is
> >the essence of an 'observer' unresolved and so hard to involve it in
> >activities for conclusions?
> >
> >I mean a short, concise plain language identification.
>
> OK, from the UDA and its arithmetical translation, an (atomic) physical
> observable yes-no proposition
> is "just" a true arithmetical sigma_1 sentence ( i. e. with the shape "it
> exists a number n such that P(n)" with F(n) decidable (= UD accessible),
> explicitely provable (= true in all consistent extensions) and
> explicitely true in at least one consistent extension. If you "quantize" p
> by []<>p, that is sum up on the world where you survive (comp immortality)
> you get the "measure 1" logic. It remains open exactly which sort of
> quantum logic we get.
> The "sensible observer" is the same + the truth of p.
>
> Let me summarize the theaetetical variants, understanding could come later
:)
>
>
> 1) Independently of comp (!)
>
> The scientific discourse = []p
> The first person discourse = []p & p
> The observer discourse = []p & <>p
> The sensible observer disc. = []p & <>p & p
>
> This gives 4 logics (G, S4Grz, Z, X), x 2, because of G/G* distinction,
> minus 1, because
> S4Grz* = S4Grz. 7 logics.
>
> 2) with comp you must add the axiom p -> []p (= the modal form of the
> arithmetical UD accessibility, I call it "1" for sigma_1: indeed EnP(n) ->
> []EnP(n))
> That gives 8 new logics: G1, S4Grz1, Z1, X1, G1*, S4Grz1*, Z1*, X1*
> Minus 1, because I conjecture (S4Grz+ p->[]p)* = S4Grz+ p->[]p.
>
>
>
> >
> >In my (non-physics) verbalizing I tried lately to identify an observer
> >with something receiving (maybe responding to) any topically relatable
> >information (not the 'bit' of course).
>
> Mmmhhhh......
>
>
> >Very close to my "cop-out" for consciousness of a decade ago.
>
> Don't hesitate to remind links or to summarize in a post.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Sat Jun 05 2004 - 11:48:29 PDT

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