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From: George Levy <glevy.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Thu, 03 Jun 2004 15:33:54 -0700

Bruno,

I reread your post of 5/11/2004 and it raised some questions and a

possible paradox involving the idea that the "notion of first person is

absolutely not formalizable." (see below, for a quotation from your post)

GL wrote

<< It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White

Rabbits to be filtered out of the

<< observable world

BM wrote:

* >>And again I totally agree. It *is* what is proved in my thesis. I
*

have done two things:

* >>1) I have given a proof that if we are machine then physics must be
*

redefined as a

* >>science which isolates and exploits a (first person plural) measure
*

on the set of all

* >>computational histories. The proof is rigorous, I would say
*

definitive (unless some systematic

* >>error of course), although provably unformalizable (so that only 1
*

person can grasp it).

* >>2) I provide a mathematical confirmation of comp by showing that
*

(thanks to Godel,

* >>Lob, Solovay ...) we can literally interview a universal machine,
*

acting like a scientist

* >>---by which I mean we will have only a third person discourse with
*

her. BUT we can

* >>interview her about the possible 1-person discourse. That is a "tour
*

de force" in the sense

* >>that the notion of first person is absolutely not formalizable (and
*

so we cannot

* >>define it in any third person way). But by using in a special way ideas
*

* >>from Plato's Theaetetus + Aristotle-Kripke modal logic + Godel's
*

incompleteness

* >>discovery make the "tour de force" easily tractable.
*

* >>Here I can only be technical or poetical, and because being technical
*

seems

* >>yet premature I will sum up by saying that with comp, the plenitude
*

is just the

* >>incredibly big "set" of universal machine's ignorance, and physics is
*

the common

* >>sharable border of that ignorance, and it has been confirmed because
*

that

* >>sharable border has been shown to obey to quantum laws.
*

* >>I get recently new result: one confirm that with comp the first
*

person can hardly know

* >>or even just believe in comp; the other (related to an error in my
*

thesis I talked

* >>about in some previous post) is the apparition of a "new" quantum
*

logic (I did

* >>not command it!) and even (I must verify) an infinity of quantum
*

logics between

* >>the singular first person and the totally sharable classical discourses.
*

* >>This could go along with your old theory that there could be a
*

continuum of

* >>person-point-of-view between the 1 and 3 person, and that would
*

confirms that you

* >>are rather gifted as an "introspecter" (do you remember? I thought
*

you were silly).

* >>But then it looks you don't like any more the 3-person discourse, why?
*

The adoption of the first person as a "frame of reference" (my

terminology) implies the ultimate relativization. In other words, the

logical system governing the mental processes of the observer becomes

part of the "frame of reference> However, we all know that human beings

do not think according to formal systems. Human systems are full of

inconsistencies, errors, etc... and very often their beliefs about the

world is just wrong. Very often they even make arithmetic errors such as

8x7 = 65.

So if we assume a relative formulation, here is the dilemma:

1) if we adopt a formal system such as the one(s) your have talked about

we assign an absolute quality to the observer which violates our premise

of relative formulation.

2) If we adopt a non-formal human logical system," we are left with an

extremely complicated task of reconciling the observations obtained by

several observers who in my terminology "share the same frame of reference"

One of the question that arise is how fundamental should be the concept

of "frame of reference" or of the mechanism/logic that underlies our

thinking:

1) Is it governed at the atomic level by physical laws down to

resolution of Planck's constant? The notion of observer is defined here

with a Planck resolution. If we share the same physical laws then we

can say that we share the same frame of reference. This option avoids

the inconsistencies of the "human logical systems" but throws out of the

window the relativistic formulation. In addition this approach provides

a neat justification for the equivalence of the sets describing the

physical world and the mental world.

2) Is it governed at the neurological or even at the psychological

level? The notion of observer here has a very coarse resolution compared

to the first option. This approach keeps the relative formulation but

becomes a quagmire because of its lack of formalism. How can the notion

of "objective reality" be defined? In fact, is there such a thing as a

true psychological objective reality? However, the fact that a

"psychological objective reality" is an oxymoron (contradiction in

terms) does not invalidate the definition of the observer at the

psychological level. Au contraire.

George Levy

Received on Thu Jun 03 2004 - 18:39:22 PDT

Date: Thu, 03 Jun 2004 15:33:54 -0700

Bruno,

I reread your post of 5/11/2004 and it raised some questions and a

possible paradox involving the idea that the "notion of first person is

absolutely not formalizable." (see below, for a quotation from your post)

GL wrote

<< It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White

Rabbits to be filtered out of the

<< observable world

BM wrote:

have done two things:

redefined as a

on the set of all

definitive (unless some systematic

person can grasp it).

(thanks to Godel,

acting like a scientist

her. BUT we can

de force" in the sense

so we cannot

incompleteness

seems

is just the

the common

that

person can hardly know

thesis I talked

logic (I did

logics between

continuum of

confirms that you

you were silly).

The adoption of the first person as a "frame of reference" (my

terminology) implies the ultimate relativization. In other words, the

logical system governing the mental processes of the observer becomes

part of the "frame of reference> However, we all know that human beings

do not think according to formal systems. Human systems are full of

inconsistencies, errors, etc... and very often their beliefs about the

world is just wrong. Very often they even make arithmetic errors such as

8x7 = 65.

So if we assume a relative formulation, here is the dilemma:

1) if we adopt a formal system such as the one(s) your have talked about

we assign an absolute quality to the observer which violates our premise

of relative formulation.

2) If we adopt a non-formal human logical system," we are left with an

extremely complicated task of reconciling the observations obtained by

several observers who in my terminology "share the same frame of reference"

One of the question that arise is how fundamental should be the concept

of "frame of reference" or of the mechanism/logic that underlies our

thinking:

1) Is it governed at the atomic level by physical laws down to

resolution of Planck's constant? The notion of observer is defined here

with a Planck resolution. If we share the same physical laws then we

can say that we share the same frame of reference. This option avoids

the inconsistencies of the "human logical systems" but throws out of the

window the relativistic formulation. In addition this approach provides

a neat justification for the equivalence of the sets describing the

physical world and the mental world.

2) Is it governed at the neurological or even at the psychological

level? The notion of observer here has a very coarse resolution compared

to the first option. This approach keeps the relative formulation but

becomes a quagmire because of its lack of formalism. How can the notion

of "objective reality" be defined? In fact, is there such a thing as a

true psychological objective reality? However, the fact that a

"psychological objective reality" is an oxymoron (contradiction in

terms) does not invalidate the definition of the observer at the

psychological level. Au contraire.

George Levy

Received on Thu Jun 03 2004 - 18:39:22 PDT

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