Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

From: George Levy <>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2004 15:59:32 -0700

Bruno Marchal wrote:

> At 15:51 10/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
> BM: But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
>> GL: No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all
>> things.
> But to say that there is no plenitude without an UD does not mean that
> the UD
> is the origin of all things.

I am being the devil's advocate. I actually agree with you, except that
I don't understand the need for a UD.

>> To paraphrase
>> "In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1).
> (Technical details: the UD is a little more than x = x+1, but OK)
>> And the UD generated the Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2, 3, ...)
> Be careful. I thought we agreed that the Plenitude is a first person
> notion.
> the O, 1, 2, 3, .... could not even be used to describe a notion of
> 3-plenitude.
> The 3-plenitude is best described by the whole arithmetical truth,
> which has been
> proved to be not describable by any finite theory. It is not
> completely unifiable.
>> . Out of the plenitude came out different worlds.
> But you *do* have understand the UDA argument (I have links!), and now
> you begin to talk
> like Schmidhuber.

Sorry that I wasn't clearer. I was just playing the devil's advocate. I
do not agree with Schmidhuber, I agree mostly with you except that I
don't see the need of a UD.

> With the comp hyp only one physical world exists, and it is an emerging
> (from the 1-point of view) appearance. It emerges from all the comp
> histories.
> For exemple, although newtonian worlds are generated by the UD, no
> consciousness
> can ever stabilize on it because it is (or should be) of measure zero.
>> Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged. We are some
>> of these creatures."
> And so this sentence has just no meaning with (classical) comp.
I agree with you.

>> This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the mind-body problem.
>> I resolve the mind-body problem at the outset by using the observer
>> as a starting point. The "I" is both an observable fact and an
>> axiom. "I" can observe that "I" am capable of logical thinking and
>> that my thoughts are consistent. ( I will leave to you the detail
>> regarding what kind of logic applies) My logical ability leads me to
>> the principle of sufficient reason One way to phrase this principle
>> is "If there is no reason for something not to be then it must be.
>> Since I am in a particular state and there is no reason for me not to
>> be in any other state, then I must also be in those states. This
>> leads me to think that there are other observers beside myself, in
>> fact, all possible observers.
>> I can also apply this same principle to the world that I observe. If
>> the world is in a particular state, and there are no reasons for this
>> world to be in this particular state, then in must be in all possible
>> states. This leads me to the plenitude. Thus the plenitude includes
>> all possible worlds.
>> The indistinguishability of which observer I am and (conjugately?)
>> which world I occupy leads to first person indeterminacy.
> I agree with all this. my point is that this is indeed the correct
> (with comp)
> discourse of the first person. I can't say more without technics.
>> As I said I think the UD is a remnant of 3rd person thinking.
> I don' t understand why you dislike so much 3-person thinking (although I
> appreciate very much your respect for the 1-person).

It is not that I dislike the 3rd person. I believe that the 1st person
is all there is. The 3rd person is only an approximation that 1st
persons can use to communicate when they share the same approximate
frame of reference. The first person can be useful, just like Newtonian
mechanics can be useful. However, in certain situations the third person
point of view just breaks down.

> 3-person thinking is called usually "science". It is communicable
> falsifiable (mainly) propositions and proofs. Like a proof that 17 is a
> prime number.

I agree. But only for observers sharing the same frame of reference.

>> It is "simpler" to assume the plenitude as an axiom than an arbitrary
>> UD. At least there is nothing arbitrary about the plenitude.
> But the UD is just a machine-independent (and thus non arbitrary)
> description of the
> comp plenitude as it can be talked about in a 3-person way by
> (consistent) machines.
> I keep insisting that the UD is not given as an possible explanation,
> but it is
> a *necessary problem* (once we postulate comp).

I don't see why the UD is necessary. Maybe I am missing something.

> I did prove that that necessary problem
> is equivalent to the extraction of the physical laws from number
> theory/arithmetic.
Why don't you use the observer himself to do this.

>> It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White
>> Rabbits to be filtered out of the observable world
> And again I totally agree. It *is* what is proved in my thesis. I have
> done two things:

> the other (related to an error in my thesis I talked
> about in some previous post) is the apparition of a "new" quantum
> logic (I did
> not command it!) and even (I must verify) an infinity of quantum
> logics between
> the singular first person and the totally sharable classical discourses.
> This could go along with your old theory that there could be a
> continuum of
> person-point-of-view between the 1 and 3 person,

As I said before, the 1st and 3rd points of view depend on the frames of
reference. You can have a continuity of points of views if you have a
continuity of frames of reference. I assume that the "Totally sharable
classical discourses" refers to the sharable frame of reference
applicable to 3rd person experience.

I also think that there is a continuity between first person (George)
and first person (Bruno).

> and that would confirms that you
> are rather gifted as an "introspecter" (do you remember? I thought
you were silly).

I remember discussing this topic but I do not remember you calling me
silly. Oh sorry you were only thinking it. Thank you :-)

Received on Tue May 11 2004 - 19:04:47 PDT

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