Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

From: George Levy <glevy.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 10 May 2004 15:51:34 -0700

Bruno,

Bruno Marchal wrote:

> At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>> My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the
>>>> (virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where
>>>> the transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the
>>>> "observer-state." Note how the observer bootstraps himself into
>>>> consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD is the "nul UD"
>>>> : it is the maximally dumb UD.
>>>
>>>
>>> A "maximally dumb" UD? I am not sure I understand.
>>
>>
>> This may be the crux of our misunderstanding. I think that an
>> observer can emerge out of the penitude without a UD. The maximally
>> dumb UD is the Null-UD.
>
>
> But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.

No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things.
This is typical classical thinking. To paraphrase:

"In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1). And the UD generated the
Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2, 3, ...). Out of the plenitude came out different
worlds. Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged. We are
some of these creatures."

This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the mind-body problem.

I resolve the mind-body problem at the outset by using the observer as a
starting point. The "I" is both an observable fact and an axiom. "I"
can observe that "I" am capable of logical thinking and that my thoughts
are consistent. ( I will leave to you the detail regarding what kind of
logic applies) My logical ability leads me to the principle of
sufficient reason One way to phrase this principle is "If there is no
reason for something not to be then it must be. Since I am in a
particular state and there is no reason for me not to be in any other
state, then I must also be in those states. This leads me to think that
there are other observers beside myself, in fact, all possible observers.

I can also apply this same principle to the world that I observe. If the
world is in a particular state, and there are no reasons for this world
to be in this particular state, then in must be in all possible states.
This leads me to the plenitude. Thus the plenitude includes all possible
worlds.

The indistinguishability of which observer I am and (conjugately?) which
world I occupy leads to first person indeterminacy.

>
> If not recall me what you mean by
> the plenitude.
> Remember also that from a machine's point
> of view (1 or 3 whatever) the plenitude
> is given by the the UD, or more exactly its
> complete execution (UD*).
>
I suppose "I" am the UD. Or maybe "I*" am the UD??? I don't know if this
makes sense.

>
>
>> First person (relative or relativistic) experience is the only one
>> that matters. The world(s) he perceives is the portion of the
>> plenitude consistent with himself. (The body must be consistent with
>> the mind)
>
>
>
>
> I agree.
>
>
>
>> It may be possible that the need to invoke a UD originates from
>> classical 3rd person (objective or absolute) thinking in which
>> several separate physical worlds are simulated.
>
>
>
>
> I disagree, or I don't understand. I don't think there
> is a *need* to *invoke* a UD. It is just
> that the UD is there, and we cannot make it
> disappears by simple wish (without
> abandoning the comp hyp).

As I said I think the UD is a remnant of 3rd person thinking. The comp
hypothesis may be better off without a UD simply because it is possible
to derive the plenitude without a UD. And should you refuse to accept
the observer as a starting point, you could assume the plenitude as a
starting pont axiom. It is "simpler" to assume the plenitude as an axiom
than an arbitrary UD. At least there is nothing arbitrary about the
plenitude.

> And a priori the
> UD is a big problem because it contains too
> many histories/realities (the white rabbits),
> and a priori it does not contain obvious mean
> to force those aberrant histories into
> a destructive interference process (unlike
> Feynman histories).

It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White
Rabbits to be filtered out of the observable world

>
George
Received on Mon May 10 2004 - 18:55:17 PDT