Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Mon, 10 May 2004 12:09:01 +0200

At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
>Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the
>>>(virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where the
>>>transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the
>>>"observer-state." Note how the observer bootstraps himself into
>>>consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD is the "nul UD" : it
>>>is the maximally dumb UD.
>>A "maximally dumb" UD? I am not sure I understand.
>This may be the crux of our misunderstanding. I think that an observer can
>emerge out of the penitude without a UD. The maximally dumb UD is the

But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
If not recall me what you mean by
the plenitude.
Remember also that from a machine's point
of view (1 or 3 whatever) the plenitude
is given by the the UD, or more exactly its
complete execution (UD*).

>First person (relative or relativistic) experience is the only one that
>matters. The world(s) he perceives is the portion of the plenitude
>consistent with himself. (The body must be consistent with the mind)

I agree.

>It may be possible that the need to invoke a UD originates from classical
>3rd person (objective or absolute) thinking in which several separate
>physical worlds are simulated.

I disagree, or I don't understand. I don't think there
is a *need* to *invoke* a UD. It is just
that the UD is there, and we cannot make it
disappears by simple wish (without
abandoning the comp hyp). And a priori the
UD is a big problem because it contains too
many histories/realities (the white rabbits),
and a priori it does not contain obvious mean
to force those aberrant histories into
a destructive interference process (unlike
Feynman histories).
And so apparently comp is false, and then
my work points on the fact that we cannot yet
conclude to the falsity of comp because, by
interviewing self-referentially correct machines
on the 1-possible histories, the machine does
propose a highly non trivial "quantum" geometry
so that destructive interference of too complex
histories remains possible (without a priori priors).

Received on Mon May 10 2004 - 06:08:17 PDT

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