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From: Kory Heath <kory.heath.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2004 05:09:27 -0500

I greatly enjoyed Tegmark's "Is 'the theory of everything' merely the

ultimate ensemble theory?", and there are parts of it that I agree with

wholeheartedly (for instance, his arguments against the idea that the AUH

is "wasteful"). However, whenever he talks about the testability of the

AUH, his views seem unjustifiably physics-centric to me.

For instance, he seems impressed by the fact that versions of our physics

with more than 3 dimensions are insufficiently stable to support atoms (and

presumably, therefore, self-aware substructures), and those with less than

3 dimensions are insufficiently complex to support SASs. These are

interesting facts, but I fail to see their importance when you consider the

entire ensemble of possible mathematical structures. For instance, consider

the infinitely many cellular automata that exist in the Mathiverse. We know

of very simple 1D, 2D, and 3D cellular automata that are computation

universal, and therefore (I believe) capable of containing SASs.

Undoubtedly there an infinite number of 4D cellular automata that are

computation universal and contain SASs that perceive their surroundings as

4D. Ditto for CA with dimensions higher than 4.

Perhaps it's true that within the ensemble of all quantum-physical

universes in Mathspace, only those with 3+1 dimensionality contain SASs.

But what possible reason do we have for believing that these SASs (or the

observer-moments of those SASs) have a greater measure than those in the

ensemble of all cellular automata?

-- Kory

Received on Sat Jan 17 2004 - 05:12:07 PST

Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2004 05:09:27 -0500

I greatly enjoyed Tegmark's "Is 'the theory of everything' merely the

ultimate ensemble theory?", and there are parts of it that I agree with

wholeheartedly (for instance, his arguments against the idea that the AUH

is "wasteful"). However, whenever he talks about the testability of the

AUH, his views seem unjustifiably physics-centric to me.

For instance, he seems impressed by the fact that versions of our physics

with more than 3 dimensions are insufficiently stable to support atoms (and

presumably, therefore, self-aware substructures), and those with less than

3 dimensions are insufficiently complex to support SASs. These are

interesting facts, but I fail to see their importance when you consider the

entire ensemble of possible mathematical structures. For instance, consider

the infinitely many cellular automata that exist in the Mathiverse. We know

of very simple 1D, 2D, and 3D cellular automata that are computation

universal, and therefore (I believe) capable of containing SASs.

Undoubtedly there an infinite number of 4D cellular automata that are

computation universal and contain SASs that perceive their surroundings as

4D. Ditto for CA with dimensions higher than 4.

Perhaps it's true that within the ensemble of all quantum-physical

universes in Mathspace, only those with 3+1 dimensionality contain SASs.

But what possible reason do we have for believing that these SASs (or the

observer-moments of those SASs) have a greater measure than those in the

ensemble of all cellular automata?

-- Kory

Received on Sat Jan 17 2004 - 05:12:07 PST

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