At 11:34 08/01/04 +0100, Georges Quenot wrote:
>I am very willing (maybe too much, that's part of the
>problem) to accept a "Platonic existence" for *the* integers.
>I am far from sure however that this does not involve a
>significant amount of faith.
Indeed. It needs an infinite act of faith. But I have no problem
with that ...
>There are some objections to
>it and I am not sure that none of them make sense. Also, as
>someone said (if anybody has the original reference, in am
>interested): the desire to believe is a reason to doubt.
>I think that, even if it is true, arithmetic realism needs
>to be postulated (or conjectured) since I can't figure how
>it could be established.
All right. That's why I explicitly put the AR in the definition of
computationalism.
About your question "is the universe computable?" the problem
depends on what you mean by "universe". The definition you gave recently
are based on some first person point of view, and even that answer does
not makes things sufficiently less ambiguous to answer. Don't hesitate
to try again. You can also read my thesis which bears
on that subject (in french). You may be interested in learning that at least
the *physical* universe cannot be computable once we postulate the comp
hypothesis (that is mainly the thesis that "I" or "You" are computable; +
Church thesis + AR). The reason is that with comp, as with Everett
(and despite minor errors in Everett on that point), the traditional
psycho-parallelism cannot be maintained. See my URL below for more.
Why there is no FAQ? Because we are still discussing the meaning of
a lot of terms ....
I agree with you in your critics of Searle. I agree with most critics of
Chalmers
too, also.
Welcome,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Thu Jan 08 2004 - 10:05:37 PST