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From: Jesse Mazer <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Wed, 07 Jan 2004 21:45:00 -0500

David Barrett-Lennard wrote:

*>
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*>Georges Quenot wrote:
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*>
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*> > Also I feel some confusion between the questions "Is the universe
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*> > computable ?" and "Is the universe actually 'being' computed ?".
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*> > What links do the participants see between them ?
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*>
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*>An important tool in mathematics is the idea of an isomorphism between
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*>two sets, which allows us to say *the* integers or *the* Mandelbrot set.
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*>This allows us to say *the* computation, and the device (if any) on
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*>which it is run is irrelevant to the existence of the computation. This
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*>relates to the idea of the Platonic existence of mathematical objects.
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*>
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*>This makes the "confusion" between the above questions irrelevant.
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*>
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*>I think it was John Searle (who argues that computers can't be aware)
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*>who said "A simulation of a hurricane is not a hurricane, therefore a
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*>simulation of mind is not mind". His argument breaks down if
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*>*everything* is a computation - because we can define an isomorphism
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*>between a computation and the simulation of that computation.
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*>
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*>- David
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Isn't there a fundamental problem deciding what it means for a given

simulated object to implement some other computation? Philosopher David

Chalmers discusses the similar question of how to decide whether a given

physical object is implementing a particular computation in his paper "Does

a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?", available here:

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/rock.html

--Jesse Mazer

_________________________________________________________________

Working moms: Find helpful tips here on managing kids, home, work — and

yourself. http://special.msn.com/msnbc/workingmom.armx

Received on Wed Jan 07 2004 - 21:48:00 PST

Date: Wed, 07 Jan 2004 21:45:00 -0500

David Barrett-Lennard wrote:

Isn't there a fundamental problem deciding what it means for a given

simulated object to implement some other computation? Philosopher David

Chalmers discusses the similar question of how to decide whether a given

physical object is implementing a particular computation in his paper "Does

a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?", available here:

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/rock.html

--Jesse Mazer

_________________________________________________________________

Working moms: Find helpful tips here on managing kids, home, work — and

yourself. http://special.msn.com/msnbc/workingmom.armx

Received on Wed Jan 07 2004 - 21:48:00 PST

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