Re: "Last-minute" vs. "anticipatory" quantum immortality

From: Stephen Paul King <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2003 00:50:37 -0500

Dear Russell and Friends,

    Does not QM's "no-cloning theorem" imply Jesse's argument?

Kindest regards,

Stephen

----- Original Message -----
From: "Russell Standish" <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
To: "Wei Dai" <weidai.domain.name.hidden>
Cc: "Jesse Mazer" <lasermazer.domain.name.hidden>; <everything-list.domain.name.hidden.com>
Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 10:45 PM
Subject: Re: "Last-minute" vs. "anticipatory" quantum immortality


> I think its a little unrealistic to assert that a given copy is
> certain to be killed. It is this certainty factor that gives rise to
> zombies. So long as there is only a 99.999...1% of something
> happening, then no zombies appear.
>
> Wei Dai wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Nov 12, 2003 at 10:11:04PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > Of course not, no more than I would treat the copy who materialized in
a
> > > room with the portrait of the candidate who went on to lose the
election as
> > > a zombie. From the point of view of myself about to be duplicated, it
was
> > > certainly be much more probable that my next experience would be of
finding
> > > myself in the room with the portrait of the candidate who would go on
to win
> > > (since after the election that copy would be duplicated 999 times
while the
> > > other would not), but the probability of ending up in the room with
the
> > > losing candidate was not zero, and after the split it is certainly
true that
> > > both copies are equally conscious.
> >
> > Suppose you get into an experiment where you're copied, then the
original
> > is certain to be killed. According to "anticipatory" quantum
immortality,
> > your probability of experiencing being the original after copying is
> > complete is 0.
> >
> > Therefore you should have no objection to the original being tortured in
> > exchange for a payment to the surviving clone, right? (Ignore for a
moment
> > your natural aversion against torturing anyone. Suppose that if you
> > objected to being tortured, a random someone else will be tortured
> > anyway.)
> >
>
>
>
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Received on Thu Nov 13 2003 - 00:55:32 PST

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