Re: "Last-minute" vs. "anticipatory" quantum immortality

From: Russell Standish <>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2003 14:45:50 +1100 (EST)

I think its a little unrealistic to assert that a given copy is
certain to be killed. It is this certainty factor that gives rise to
zombies. So long as there is only a 99.999...1% of something
happening, then no zombies appear.

Wei Dai wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 12, 2003 at 10:11:04PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Of course not, no more than I would treat the copy who materialized in a
> > room with the portrait of the candidate who went on to lose the election as
> > a zombie. From the point of view of myself about to be duplicated, it was
> > certainly be much more probable that my next experience would be of finding
> > myself in the room with the portrait of the candidate who would go on to win
> > (since after the election that copy would be duplicated 999 times while the
> > other would not), but the probability of ending up in the room with the
> > losing candidate was not zero, and after the split it is certainly true that
> > both copies are equally conscious.
> Suppose you get into an experiment where you're copied, then the original
> is certain to be killed. According to "anticipatory" quantum immortality,
> your probability of experiencing being the original after copying is
> complete is 0.
> Therefore you should have no objection to the original being tortured in
> exchange for a payment to the surviving clone, right? (Ignore for a moment
> your natural aversion against torturing anyone. Suppose that if you
> objected to being tortured, a random someone else will be tortured
> anyway.)

A/Prof Russell Standish Director
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Received on Wed Nov 12 2003 - 22:47:57 PST

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