Re: Quantum accident survivor

From: Stephen Paul King <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2003 19:48:27 -0500

Dear Russell,

    I know about Bruno's theory. I have studied it and written a lot about
it. I like it. IMHO, it is the 21th Century version of Berkeley's Idealism.

    My problem is that COMP requires the existence of an infinite
computational system that is immune from the laws of thermodynamics. That
makes it HIGHLY suspect in my book. Even if we make the "leap of faith" and
assume that all that exists is numbers and the relations among them, how do
we explain the reason that the "illusion" of a "flow of time" occurs?
    I have my own ideas about "infinite computers" but they would require
some kind of "resource".
    "Independence of substrate", as I see it, does not imply the
non-existence OF some substrate. If there is nothing that "persists in time"
how can a Turing Machine exist? It does require some kind of "tape" and
"head" that are "substantial" in some way.

Stephen

----- Original Message -----
From: "Russell Standish" <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
Cc: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Monday, November 03, 2003 6:10 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor


> Not dualism per se - I'm sure Bruno would argue that he doesn't need
> the hypothesis of a concrete universe with physial bodies in it.
>
> However, I think you are correct in suggesting it does depend on an
> independence of substrate, which is what Bruno means by COMP -
> survivability of first person experience through substitution of the
> substrate.
>
> NB even though Bruno calls this hypothesis COMP, it is really more
> general than computationalism, in that
>
> computationalism => COMP
>
> but the reverse syllogism is not demonstrated anywhere to my knowledge.
>
> Cheers
>
> Stephen Paul King wrote:
> >
> > Dear Saibal and Russell,
> >
> > Does not this entire notion of "quantum immortality" assume some
kind of
> > mind/body dualism in that the mind, consciousness, is independent of the
> > particular physical circumstances? There must be some way for the
Moments,
> > specifiec in #1, to be "strung together" in a first person way. This is,
> > IMHO, strongly implied in Marchal's ideas using the UD. Even Barbour's
"time
> > capsules" imply this.
> > I must confess to a bias toward dualistic models, particularly
Vaughan
> > Pratt's Chu space transform based idea, but this is something that is
> > implied but does not seem to ever be discussed. Why?
> >
> > Stephen
> >
>
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
> A/Prof Russell Standish            Director
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(mobile)
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Received on Mon Nov 03 2003 - 19:53:30 PST

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