Not dualism per se - I'm sure Bruno would argue that he doesn't need
the hypothesis of a concrete universe with physial bodies in it.
However, I think you are correct in suggesting it does depend on an
independence of substrate, which is what Bruno means by COMP -
survivability of first person experience through substitution of the
substrate.
NB even though Bruno calls this hypothesis COMP, it is really more
general than computationalism, in that
computationalism => COMP
but the reverse syllogism is not demonstrated anywhere to my knowledge.
Cheers
Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
> Dear Saibal and Russell,
>
> Does not this entire notion of "quantum immortality" assume some kind of
> mind/body dualism in that the mind, consciousness, is independent of the
> particular physical circumstances? There must be some way for the Moments,
> specifiec in #1, to be "strung together" in a first person way. This is,
> IMHO, strongly implied in Marchal's ideas using the UD. Even Barbour's "time
> capsules" imply this.
> I must confess to a bias toward dualistic models, particularly Vaughan
> Pratt's Chu space transform based idea, but this is something that is
> implied but does not seem to ever be discussed. Why?
>
> Stephen
>
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Received on Mon Nov 03 2003 - 18:11:51 PST