Joao Leao wrote:
> James N Rose wrote:
>
> > Joao wrote:
> >
> > "Speaking as a devout Platonist ..."
> >
> > About 7 years ago I realized there was
> > a severe contradiction resident in modern
> > concepts of Being.
> >
> > Godel's Incompleteness Theorems have
> > established a condition-of-knowledge which seem
> > to challenge if not negate Platonic thought.
>
> That just happens to be totally orthogonal to what
> Godel himself expressed as his own opinion on the
> consequence of his theorem... Godel is possibly
> the most consequent of all XXcent. self professed
> Platonists.
>
> >
> > I'd like to get your ideas on the following:
> >
> > Consider the Platonic Ideal of 'apple'. I can
> > almost guarantee that your mind immediately came
> > up with an image of 'apple' including stem, colorful
> > skin, other qualities, etc.
> >
> > As Godel designated -system internally consistent-,
> > we might at first presume the two depictions to be
> > isomorphic.
>
> Why? Is there any reason why my "apple" need to
> fit a consistent system of "appleness"? I don't think so...
>
> > But I submit that per Godel, 'apple' includes only
> > those characteristics or qualia evident up to
> > but not external to the bounds of the system,
> > whatever they may be.
> >
> > That being the case, 'color' of any existential
> > ideal-apple exists only in the out-space where the
> > platonic apple per se -does not-.
> >
> > Therefore 'color' and 'apple' - in any platonic sense -
> > must be mutually exclusive. Which seems to press the
> > 2500 year old standing impression of 'ideal apple'.
>
> Not at all. You are confusing images with things and
> forgetting a good deal of what platonism is about. An
> apple, this apple, the apple I am thinking of, all partake
> the form of "appleness" whatever that is. The color of
> this apple, the color of that bird, this red, the "red" you
> are thinking of right now", all partake of the form of
> "redness" in the Patonic world. There is no contradition
> here. There are no forms here!
>
> >
> >
> > Another discontinuity.
> >
> > If you climb Mount Everest and sit down on it,
> > does the mountain now satisfy the platonic ideal
> > of "chair"?
>
> No, why should it? The form of a chair is not the
> form of "anything I sit on"! You can sit on a table
> or on your head for all I care... This is a different in
> "extension" which is much easier to grasp than one
> of intention, but it is the same think.
>
> > Thanks in advance for your thoughts,
> >
> > James Rose
>
> I am afraid you are obviously confused about the basis of
> platonism and the dispute with kantianism, if you will.
> I suggest you read Stanley Rosen's "Antiplatonism" in
> his collection "The Ancients and the Moderns" for a
> recent and detailed review of the issue you raise, namely
> conditions-of-knowledge as conditions-of-being, a
> sibject prone to post-kantian confusions....
>
> Regards,
>
> -Joao Leao
>
> --
>
> Joao Pedro Leao ::: jleao.domain.name.hidden
> Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
> 1815 Massachussetts Av. , Cambridge MA 02140
> Work Phone: (617)-496-7990 extension 124
> VoIP Phone: (617)=384-6679
> Cell-Phone: (617)-817-1800
> ----------------------------------------------
> "All generalizations are abusive (specially this one!)"
> -------------------------------------------------------
--
Joao Pedro Leao ::: jleao.domain.name.hidden
Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
1815 Massachussetts Av. , Cambridge MA 02140
Work Phone: (617)-496-7990 extension 124
VoIP Phone: (617)=384-6679
Cell-Phone: (617)-817-1800
----------------------------------------------
"All generalizations are abusive (specially this one!)"
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Received on Mon Jun 16 2003 - 12:53:49 PDT