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From: Ben Goertzel <ben.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 16:43:32 -0200

Bruno wrote:

***

Let me insist because some people seem not yet grasping

fully that idea.

In fact that 1/3-distinction makes COMP incompatible with

the thesis that the universe is a machine. If I am a machine then

the universe cannot be a machine. No machine can simulate the

comp first person indeterminacy. This shows that the

Wolfram-Petrov-Suze-... thesis is just inconsistent. If the universe

is a (digital) machine then there is level of description of myself

such that I am a machine (= I am turing-emulable, = comp), but then

my most probable neighborhood is given by a sum over all

computational histories going through my possible states, and by

godel (but see also the thought experiments) that leads to extract

the probable neighborhood from a non computable domain, in a

non computable way. In short WOLFRAM implies COMP, but COMP

implies NOT WOLFRAM(*). So WOLFRAM implies NOT WOLFRAM, so NOT WOLFRAM.

Eventually physics will be reduced into machine's machine

psychology. If octonion play a fundamental role in physics,

it means, with comp, that octonions will play a fundamental role

in psychology.

***

Unfortunately, I do not follow your argument in spite of some significant

effort.

When you say "sum over all computational histories", what if we just fix a

bound N, and then say "sum over all computational histories of algorithmic

info. content <= N." Finite-information-content-universe, no Godel

problems. So what's the issue?

***

And, dear Ben, I should still read how you link octonions

and the "deep aspect", as you say, of the mind.

BTW, I would be also glad if you could explain or give a rough

idea how quaternions play a role in the mondane aspect of the

mind, as you pretend in one of your paper,

if you have the time.

***

I'll address this in a later post, unfortunately I have to catch a plane and

don't have time at the moment

ben

Received on Fri Nov 22 2002 - 12:36:53 PST

Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 16:43:32 -0200

Bruno wrote:

***

Let me insist because some people seem not yet grasping

fully that idea.

In fact that 1/3-distinction makes COMP incompatible with

the thesis that the universe is a machine. If I am a machine then

the universe cannot be a machine. No machine can simulate the

comp first person indeterminacy. This shows that the

Wolfram-Petrov-Suze-... thesis is just inconsistent. If the universe

is a (digital) machine then there is level of description of myself

such that I am a machine (= I am turing-emulable, = comp), but then

my most probable neighborhood is given by a sum over all

computational histories going through my possible states, and by

godel (but see also the thought experiments) that leads to extract

the probable neighborhood from a non computable domain, in a

non computable way. In short WOLFRAM implies COMP, but COMP

implies NOT WOLFRAM(*). So WOLFRAM implies NOT WOLFRAM, so NOT WOLFRAM.

Eventually physics will be reduced into machine's machine

psychology. If octonion play a fundamental role in physics,

it means, with comp, that octonions will play a fundamental role

in psychology.

***

Unfortunately, I do not follow your argument in spite of some significant

effort.

When you say "sum over all computational histories", what if we just fix a

bound N, and then say "sum over all computational histories of algorithmic

info. content <= N." Finite-information-content-universe, no Godel

problems. So what's the issue?

***

And, dear Ben, I should still read how you link octonions

and the "deep aspect", as you say, of the mind.

BTW, I would be also glad if you could explain or give a rough

idea how quaternions play a role in the mondane aspect of the

mind, as you pretend in one of your paper,

if you have the time.

***

I'll address this in a later post, unfortunately I have to catch a plane and

don't have time at the moment

ben

Received on Fri Nov 22 2002 - 12:36:53 PST

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